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1ASPECTS  OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE IN SOME
TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNDER
FUND-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS
W.  BUITER
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.  Outline
This paper contains a selective review of some of the key fiscal issues
faced by transition economies.  The twelve countries that provide the
empirical background for this study have all been under Fund
programs for at least some of the time since they initiated their
transitions from plan to market.  The subject matter of the paper is
vast and complicated.  No doubt there are, in the selection of topics
covered, both type I and type II errors.  The focus of the paper is on
medium- and longer-term fiscal issues, such as government solvency
and the evaluation of the sustainability of the government’s fiscal-
financial-monetary program.  The purpose of the paper is to assist
the design and implementation of future Fund programs and to
improve the quality of the debate about the design and conduct of
fiscal policy in transition economies generally.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Following the
Introduction, which contains a brief discussion of the roles of the
Fund, Section 2 sets out a framework for evaluating the
sustainability of the fiscal-financial-monetary program of the state.
Section 3 contains some numerical material on public debt, deficits
(including quasi-fiscal deficits) and monetary financing or
seigniorage.  Section 4 discusses eight specific budgetary issues I
consider to be of special relevance to transition economies.  Section
5 concludes by summarising the lessons from this study in a number
of propositions.
1.2. Fiscal Sustainability in Transition Economies
2In many transition economies, large fiscal deficits have emerged and
persisted.  Grave consequences are commonly attributed to
“excessive deficits”.  There is no consensus, however, on when fiscal
deficits become “excessive”, nor is there a generally accepted
operational methodology for evaluating the sustainability of
alternative fiscal-financial programs.  Despite this methodological
vacuum, the following qualitative characterisation of the
consequences of government deficits is likely to be non-
controversial.
Deficits must be financed either by borrowingi or by printing
money.  Compare a fiscal-financial strategy of financing a given
spending program by taxing today (using lump-sum taxes) with one
of borrowing (that is, postponing taxation) and imposing additional
future lump-sum taxes equal in present discounted value to the taxes
postponed today.  The borrowing strategy will, on balance,
redistribute life-time resources from the young to the old and from
generations yet to be born to generations currently alive.  Unless
generations are linked through operative Ricardian gift and bequest
motives, borrowing will therefore reduce national saving and the
national financial wealth-income ratio.  Whenever domestic and
foreign saving are imperfect substitutes (or the world rate of interest
is not independent of the government’s borrowing program), this will
cause financial “crowding out” and reduce domestic fixed capital
formation. Government borrowing will likewise raise the cost and/or
restrict the availability of working capital for enterprises.  This may
adversely affect production even in the short-run, before any
possible adverse effects of lower rates of fixed capital formation on
productive potential have had time to manifest themselves.  Calvo
and Coricelli [1992] have argued that short-run negative supply-side
crowding out may have played a role in Poland during 1990.
When a government reaches the limit of the amount of its debt
that the domestic private sector and the rest of the world will absorb
voluntarily, monetising the deficit or default (including arrears)
become the only financing options if the primary (non-interest)
deficit is not adjusted.  The real value of the amount of resources the
government can extract by issuing additional monetary liabilities
3(that is, the real value of its seigniorage) is limited by the negative
effect of rising nominal interest rates and increasing expected rates of
inflation and currency depreciation on the demand for real money
balances. When the maximal amount of seigniorage that can be
extracted is less than the financing gap faced by the government,
hyperinflation and/or default are the only possible outcomes.
While this brief characterisation of the consequences of
excessive deficits is likely to be non-controversial, there is no
consensus on the key issue of the determinants of the limit on the
amount of public debt that would be voluntarily held.  In view of the
effects of public debt on national saving, financial crowding out and
inflation, it is also apparent that public debt can be excessive, even if
its quantity is below the maximal amount that would be held
voluntarily.  Likewise, inflation caused by the monetisation of
deficits can be excessive even if it falls short of hyperinflation.  This
paper outlines one simple methodology for quantifying the nexus
between public debt, deficits, public spending, taxation and
monetary growth and applies it to twelve transition economies.ii
1.3. The Roles of the Fund
The Fund performs three distinct roles.  The first is its systemic role.
The second is its financial role ?  the provision, subject to financial
and policy conditionality, of short-term financing to individual
member countries in balance-of-payments difficulties.  The third is
its technical assistance role.  The systemic role ?  managing the
adjustable peg exchange rate system established at Bretton Woods
and providing it with sufficient liquidity ?  effectively came to an end
in 1972 with the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate
system. Private capital markets increasingly took over the role of the
Fund as a provider of global liquidity and a source of short-term
financing for the more advanced industrial countries.  Exchange rate
surveillance is the principal surviving offspring of this systemic role,
but it is just a pale reflection of the earlier systemic function, mainly
because the Fund has no effective sticks or carrots with which to
influence the policies of the leading industrial countries.  A second
4surviving feature of its global or systemic role is the Fund’s
participation in (and often leadership of) efforts to put together
financial rescue packages for countries whose financial troubles are
deemed to threaten the stability of financial markets globally.iii  The
recent Mexican crisis is a frequently cited example of this function.
Effective conditionality tends to be a problem when the client
country is significant enough to generate global spillovers.
The Fund’s technical assistance role has gained increasing
importance in recent years.  Many newly independent countries and
countries undergoing profound structural transformations, including
those engaged in the transition from central planning to the market
economy, did not start off with appropriate institutions for
conducting monetary policy, managing the exchange rate, raising
revenues, budgeting and controlling public expenditures and
engaging in fiscal and financial policy generally.  The Fund has
accumulated a vast stock of knowledge and expertise for the creation
of the institutions necessary for macroeconomic management in
often inhospitable environments.
This paper focuses on the second role of the Fund, that is, its
role in assisting individual countries in financial difficulties and with
restricted access to the international financial markets.  While the
resources made available under Fund programs are often
characterised as balance-of-payments assistance, that description is
not helpful for understanding the causes and consequences of, or the
solutions to, the problems faced by the countries in question.
Balance of payments crises are symptoms rather than causes of
trouble.   The causes of persistent and unsustainable balance-of-
payments imbalances are almost invariably domestic.  So are the
remedies.  This remains true even when one recognises that external
shocks can be extremely painful and that external assistance,
whether in the form of conventional aid or debt forgiveness, can
facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform when the
causes of the problem have been properly diagnosed and the
appropriate adjustment policies are being pursued.
At the core of virtually any financial crisis, whether it manifests
itself as a balance of payments crisis or as a crisis of the domestic
5financial system, lies either an inconsistent and unsustainable fiscal-
financial-monetary program or defective financial regulation (or both
as in the case of the Russian Federation, among others).  This paper
will focus on the sustainability of the fiscal-financial-monetary
program, although regulatory issues will be referred to where
appropriate.
In its individual country assistance role, the Fund has two
tasks. The first is to help a government that is insolvent under
current and projected future policies to achieve solvency.  This
involves diagnosis (that is, technical assistance) when the cause of
the problem is a failure by domestic policy makers to understand
macroeconomic causes and consequences and/or conditionality
capable of inducing the government to pursue policies it would not
otherwise have adopted, when political imperatives compel the
government to knowingly pursue unsustainable policies.  The second
task is to ensure that a solvent government is not subject to
constraints other than the long-run intertemporal budget constraint;
cash-flow, liquidity or borrowing constraints are examples of such
unnecessary and avoidable constraints on a government’s freedom to
act.
The contribution of the Fund to the achievement of solvency
by a prima-facie insolvent government is modest, but nevertheless
important.  Other than expert advice, all it can offer is temporary
financing. iv  The Fund cannot itself make a significant permanent
resource transfer to countries in financial difficulties.  It has neither
the authority nor the resources to boost a government’s (or nation’s)
flow of current and future primary surpluses by committing itself to
provide a flow of current transfers (aid).  Nor can it appreciably
reduce a country’s indebtedness by making a significant capital
transfer out of its own resources.  It can be helpful by acting as an
honest broker between the debtor government and its creditors and
by twisting arms in the right places.  For instance, avoiding free rider
problems among creditor countries in the case of a sovereign debtor
default is made easier if the Fund and its key member governments
can lean on recalcitrant creditors standing in the way of an orderly
work-out.
6Restoring solvency by boosting primary surpluses is
fundamentally the task of the insolvent government itself.  The
process can benefit from the support of those international agencies
and other multilateral and bilateral institutions that provide
development assistance, either in the form of explicit foreign aid or
through external debt forgiveness.  The Fund’s role in facilitating an
efficient bargain with private external creditors has already been
referred to.   The Fund’s ability to impose effective conditionality on
program countries, that is, conditionality capable of altering policies,
is as crucial for the success of the program as it is limited, especially
in the case of larger and high-profile trouble cases.  Mexico and
Russia are recent cases in point.
The second task of the Fund when dealing with a country in
financial difficulties is to ensure that a solvent government is not
restricted in the performance of its essential tasks by remediable
capital market imperfections.  In other words, the Fund should
enable a solvent government to act according to the permanent
income hypothesis without regard to short-term cash-flow, liquidity
or borrowing constraints.v  This role is especially important in
developing countries undergoing structural change and economic
reform and in transition economies.  With complete, perfect
international and domestic capital markets this function of the Fund
would of course not exist.  Capital market failure is therefore the
essential raison d’être of the Fund.
In the case of the transition economies, the reasons for the
failure of private capital markets to generate adequate resource
transfers are not difficult to explain.  In the early years of the
transition, neither the private sector nor the government have much
of a track record as borrowers.  Creditworthiness, with or without
sovereign guarantee, is therefore very difficult to establish.
Ambiguous and constantly changing laws, regulations and legal
procedures make contract enforcement problematic and costly for
potential private creditors.  If it is more costly for a sovereign debtor
to repudiate its obligations to the Fund than to private creditors, a
special role for the Fund in the international intermediation process
for transition economies is easily rationalised.
7For overcoming short-term liquidity or cash-flow constraints,
even the short-term lending facilities of the Fund can be helpful
indeed.  In the cases of Mexico and Russia, the magnitudes of the
Fund’s own credit lines have been significant.  Possibly even more
important is the “seal of good housekeeping” that the approval by
the Fund of a formal Fund program bestows on the program country.
This acts as a signal for private lenders and other private sources of
funds to revise downward the country risk premium of the program
country.  The resulting induced inflows of private capital can easily
exceed the resources coming from the Fund by an order of
magnitude or more. Again the need for (correct) diagnoses of the
causes of financial problems to be backed up by effective
conditionality on often weak and incompetent governments is
paramount.
2.  GOVERNMENT SOLVENCY AND THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FISCAL-FINANCIAL-
MONETARY PROGRAM: AN OPERATIONAL
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1.  The Scope of Government
As emphasised by Tanzi [1993], under central planning, before
transition has started, the very concepts of fiscal policy and public
finance are nebulous.  Public finance exists only if there is private
finance, that is, if there exists a significant private sector.
Once transition gets under way and a significant private sector
emerges, public finance and public sector financial deficits become
meaningful concepts.  For our purposes the relevant definition of the
state or the government is that of the sovereign.  Included are all
agencies that can levy taxes or issue legal tender and all agencies
engaged in public administration (mainly the provision of
intermediate public goods and services, supervision and regulation).
Both the capacity to tax and the ability to issue legal tender are
ultimately backed by the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of
8force.  Under normal circumstances these are reinforced by social
consensus (or acquiescence) and trust.  For practical purposes this
means that the government is the consolidated (or combined) general
government and central bank.  When the term ‘government’ is used
without qualification in what follows, it is this combined general
government and central bank sector that we have in mind.
General government includes central, state, provincial, local
and other lower-tier government institutions, as well as off-budget
agencies such as the social security funds, privatisation funds etc.  It
excludes the state enterprise sector.  Of course, current and future
transfers (subsidies) between the state enterprise sector and the
government must all be allowed for in the assessment of the
sustainability of the government’s fiscal-financial-monetary program.
It is clearly essential that, in addition to the central
government, the fiscal role of all lower government tiers be
considered.  Both expenditure and revenue raising responsibilities
can be shifted between various tiers of government and lower levels
of government often borrow on their own account, but with ultimate
recourse to the credit of the central government.  By focusing only
on one tier, even if this is a key tier like the central government, a
very distorted picture of the total financial exposure of the
government can emerge.
The need to include all off-budget agencies and units whose
liabilities ultimately are the responsibility of the state should be self-
evident as following any other procedure would invite endless
window-dressing.
2.2.  The Central Bank’s Quasi-Fiscal Deficit and the Contingent
Deferred Fiscal Deficit
The need to include the central bank arises from the ability of the
government to shift outlays and receipts from the conventionally
measured general government budget to the central bank (giving rise
to the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank) or to the  non-central
bank financial sector, giving rise to the contingent deferred fiscal
deficit.  Quasi-fiscal outlays and receipts are operations of the
9central bankvi that are functionally equivalent to subsidies and taxes
imposed by the general government sector.  Some of the most
common examples are central bank credits at subsidised rates of
interest (equivalent to interest subsidies), losses associated with the
purchase and sale of foreign exchange in a multiple exchange rate
system (equivalent to foreign exchange subsidies or taxes) and the
imposition on commercial banks of reserve requirements obliging
them to hold central bank liabilities with below market rates of
interest (equivalent to a tax on deposits.  These quasi-fiscal
operations should be converted into their subsidy or tax equivalents
and added to the conventionally measured primary deficit of the
central bank.  This primary deficit of the central bank should then be
consolidated with the primary deficit of the general government
sector to obtain what I call the primary deficit of the government
sector.  Likewise the financial deficit of the central bank should be
consolidated with the financial deficit of the general government
sector to obtain the financial deficit of the government sector.vii
A contingent deferred fiscal deficit arises when the central
bank or some other general government agency are known to be
willing and able to engage in a future bail out of a state enterprise
(or private enterprise with continued political clout) either directly
or by bailing out a commercial bank that has made a non-performing
loan to the enterprise in questions.  Until the bail-out transfer from
(say) the central bank to (say) the commercial bank actually happens
(for instance through a recapitalisation of the now bankrupt
commercial bank), nothing would be recorded either in the general
government financial deficit or in the quasi-fiscal deficit of the
central bank, even under the most sophisticated accounting
conventions.  It is clear, however, that, without its implicit
guarantee of the commercial bank loan to the enterprise, the
resource transfer from the commercial bank to the enterprise would
not have happened.  The current resource transfer from the
commercial banks to the state enterprise represents a contingent
deferred fiscal deficit.
The quasi-fiscal deficits and the contingent deferred fiscal
deficits matter quantitatively. For instance, Russia’s State Savings
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Bank, Sberbank, currently (end-March 1996) holds about 70% of all
household savings and has been using these resources to keep other
banks and the Russian government afloat.  The Russian central bank
retains a 51% equity stake in Sberbank.  The remaining 49% are
owned by other commercial banks.  More than a third of the bank’s
assets (Rbs30,000bn or $6bn) are held in Russian Treasury bills
(GKO’s).  This also represents almost a third of the Russian
government’s Treasury debt.  While savings banks in many
developed countries hold more than a third of their assets in the
form of government securities, there is a sense that Sberbank, acting
on the instructions of either the central bank or government or both,
accumulated at least some of these GKOs at prices higher than
would otherwise have prevailed in the market.  In addition, Sberbank
appears to have been prodded by the government into keeping the
banking industry afloat by lending to several cash-strapped
institutions, some of which are its own shareholders.  This quasi-
official role has been especially prominent since a confidence crisis
temporarily paralysed the inter-bank market during the autumn of
1995.  Even if the government loans were free of default risk (which
they are not), the quality of its loan portfolio to the banking sector
appears highly dubious, and there is a serious risk of large contingent
deferred fiscal deficits, if there are failures among the banks to whom
Sberbank has lent and the solvency of Sberbank is thereby
threatened.  These contingent liabilities either come from the deposit
insurance obligations of the state vis-à-vis the depositors (an
obligation which is likely to be taken seriously since hyperinflation
wiped out the real value of Sberbank deposits during 1992) and from
the implicit guarantee given by the state to guarantee the survival of
Sberbank as a going concern ?  the benefit of being an institution too
big and too visible to fail.
Conceptually, what one is after is clear.  It is the present
discounted value of all current and future net resource transfers
between the government and any other agent or sector.viii  The
present value of these net resource transfers between the government
and any other agent can, in principle, be computed in the same way
as the generational accounts of Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff
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[1991] (see also Buiter [1995b]), which are accounts, one for each
generation, that ad up, in present discounted value, the amount of
receipts less payments the government can expect to collect from
each generation over its remaining lifetime.
The various components of the contingent deferred fiscal
deficit accrue in ways that are not recorded in the accounts of any
government agency.  They ultimately show up as capital transfers
(through balance sheet restructuring, through recapitalisation of
bankrupt commercial banks, through deposit insurance pay-outs etc)
often long after the real resource transfers have taken place.
Various coarse practical approximations to these streams of
current and future net resource transfers is all that can, in practice,
be hoped for.  The conventional fiscal deficit, the quasi-fiscal
deficit of the central bank and the contingent deferred fiscal deficit
are partial observable proxies for this unobservable sequence of
future net resource transfers.
A key lesson for policy reform and “sequencing” is that
delayed structural transformation, especially the failure to impose
hard budget constraints on (former) state enterprises (or on the
agricultural sector) can be a major contributor to all three deficits.
Since the quasi-fiscal deficit and the contingent deferred fiscal deficit
are much less transparent than the conventional fiscal deficit, a
prerequisite for achieving fiscal control in the medium- and long-
term may well be the minimisation (and preferably the abolition) of
the quasi-fiscal and contingent deferred fiscal deficits.  This would
be valuable even though it involves, in the first instance, no more
than moving the implicit subsidies, grants and transfers wholesale
into the general government budget as explicit budgetary
transactions (see Tanzi [1993]).
As a simple rule of thumb, one could assume that all credit
extended by the central bank to all sectors other than the general
government, represents de facto quasi-fiscal grants or subsidies.  This
may not be totally realistic in the more advanced transition
economies, where the central banks probably do extend credit on
near-market terms to bona-fide, solvent borrowers who service these
debts and do not engage in Ponzi finance.  The amount of such
12
bona-fide central bank credit is, however, likely to be small.ix
Following the proposed rule of thumb, the augmented financial
deficit of the central bank would then be the sum of its
conventionally measured financial deficit and the net increase in
central bank credit to all non-general government sectors.x  This
augmented financial deficit of the central bank could then be added
to the financial deficit of the general government sector to get the
augmented financial deficit of the consolidated general government
and central bank.
Virtually all future outlays and receipts of the government are
uncertain.  This holds whether or not they derive from formal
contractual obligations already entered into (such as interest on
floating rate debt or payments due as a result of the exercise of a
loan guarantee), from the existing tax-transfer system (or from the
tax-transfer system assumed to be operative in the relevant future
periods) or from past and present political commitments (which may
be more or less credible) to future exhaustive public spending
programs. Ideally, such uncertain or contingent future cash flows
would be ‘priced’ today, that is, they should be reduced to a
current-dated (present value) contingent liability or claim.
Conceptually, this is an exercise in option pricing.  In practice it
often turns out to be an infeasible nightmare.  Nevertheless, the ideal
should be kept firmly in mind, even in the most practical, applied
policy setting, lest grievous errors be committed in the assessment of
the viability of the government’s budgetary program.
2.3 The Importance of Taking the Long View
The key point for this sub-section is to emphasise the need to take a
long-term view of the government’s fiscal-financial-monetary
program.  In principle, we should consider all current and
anticipated future (uncertain) cash flows between the government
sector, the rest of the domestic economy (private sector and state
enterprises) and the rest of the world.  Failure to do so can lead
policy and program evaluation and design being based on a distorted
13
series of snapshots that can give a wholly inaccurate characterisation
of the evolution of the underlying fiscal-financial-monetary reality.
One implication of this view is that neither the current value of
the financial deficit (even that of the consolidated general
government and central bank), or even the value of the financial
deficit over the next two or three years is unlikely to be an
informative indicator of anything that might be of interest to the
Fund or anyone else. Specifically, it is not a reliable measure of the
change in the government’s net worth, even if we “correct” for the
effects of inflation and exchange rate depreciation on the real value
of outstanding stock of financial assets and liabilities.  Neither is it a
reliable indicator of the change in the burden the government is
imposing on future generations (and on the generations currently
alive during their remaining lifetimes).  Neither is it a reliable
indicator of the financial crowding out pressure created by the
government budget.  The same stricture applies to the change in the
current financial deficit, and to any short sequence of such changes.
The continuing focus of IMF programs on the conventional general
government financial deficit is therefore hard to rationalise.
The same “uninformativeness” attaches to the level of and
changes in the current and near-future values of the government’s
primary deficit.  The reason is that it is simply too easy to shift cash
flows from the present to the future, either by accounting sleight of
hand or by economically costly cosmetic (and often unsustainable)
changes in expenditures and revenues.  The only defence against this
is to trace the current and future cash flows of the government far
enough into the future to ensure that, with reasonable discount rates,
yet later changes in cash flows do not have an appreciable effect on
the present discounted value of all current and future cash flows.
The myopic financial indicators used by the Fund in the evaluation
and design of macroeconomic policy packages are often less than
useless (see Kotlikoff [1989] and Tanzi [1993]).
2.4.  The Government’s Solvency Constraint
14
Central to our evaluation of the medium-term and long-run
sustainability of the government’s fiscal-financial and monetary
program is the government’s intertemporal budget constraint or
solvency constraint.  The starting point is the familiar single-period
budget identity of the consolidated general government and central
bank (henceforth the government), which states that the
government’s financial deficit is financed by issuing domestic or
foreign currency denominated interest-bearing debt, by printing
money or by running down official international foreign exchange
reserves.
With some rearranging and re-definition, the government
budget identity yields the two following compact representations of
the dynamics of the government debt-GDP ratio.  bt is the ratio of
the government debt at the end of period t to period t GDP ;  r is the
real interest rate; g is the growth rate of real GDP;  s is the
(adjusted)xi government primary (non-interest) surplus as a fraction
of GDP; s is seigniorage, that is, the increase in the base money stock
as a fraction of GDP; p is the inflation rate, d is the (adjusted)xii
government financial deficit as a fraction of GDP and D is the
backward difference operator.
and
Equation (1) states that, if the interest rate exceeds the growth
rate of GDP, the debt-GDP ratio will be rising unless the sum of the
(adjusted) primary surplus and the seigniorage revenue appropriated
by the government are sufficient to offset the explosive “intrinsic
debt dynamics”.  Equation (2) states that the rate of decline of the
debt-GDP ratio equals (approximatelyxiii) the growth rate of nominal
GDP times the outstanding debt-GDP ratio, plus the (adjusted)
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government financial deficit (as a fraction of GDP), minus
seigniorage (as a fraction of GDP).
Equation (1) is in many ways rather more informative than
equation (2), because the financial deficit includes the interest bill of
the government, uncorrected for changes in the real value of the
government debt or for the effect of real GDP growth on the debt-
GDP ratio.  The Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria (which are
relevant to those transition economies (mainly east European) that
have ambitions to join the European Union and are therefore likely
to be confronted with the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and
with the fiscal conditions of the ‘Stability Pact’ likely to succeed it)
are specified in terms of a general government debt-GPD ratio ceiling
of 60% and a general government financial deficit-GDP ratio ceiling
of 3%.  We can reinterpret equation (2) to apply to the debt and
deficit of the general government sector by setting seigniorage, s,
equal to zero and reinterpreting b and d as the debt, respectively the
financial deficit, of the general government sector, including general
government debt held by the central bank.  The Maastricht debt and
deficit ceilings would be (approximatelyxiv) consistent with each
other at a steady state growth rate of nominal GDP of 5% per
annum.
The debt-dynamics given in equation (1) imply that at any
point in time, the outstanding debt is equal in value to the present
discounted value of future primary surpluses and future seigniorage
between the current date and some terminal future date, plus the
present discounted value of the debt held at that terminal future
date.  Solving (1) recursively forward in time yields, for F$t,
If the institution of government were known to come to a
sudden end at some future date, the natural solvency constraint to
impose is that the government cannot leave a positive amount of debt
outstanding at the end of the world.  If F$t is the finite terminal date,
the solvency constraint would be Fb   0£ .1
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It follows that, for any solvent government, the value of its
outstanding debt would equal the present discounted value of the
future streams of primary surpluses and seigniorage.
While governments have finite horizons, the institution of
government has no natural terminal date.  As long as successive
governments honour the debts they inherit, the finite-horizon
solvency constraint that any debt be paid off no later than the (finite)
terminal date, clearly does not apply.  Traditionally, it has been
replaced by the “No-Ponzi scheme” condition, that, in the long-run,
the present discounted value of the terminal debt of the government
goes to zero, that is,
Note that this constraint only makes sense in a world where the
long-run (after-tax) interest rate on the public debt exceeds the long-
run growth rate of GDP.  With this constraint, it remains true, even
in an economy without a finite terminal date, that the value of the
initial stock of debt is equal to the present discounted value of the
(infinite) streams of future primary surpluses and seigniorage, that is,
The conventional government solvency constraint or no-Ponzi
finance constraint is actually quite weak.  In an economy  in which
the (after-tax) interest rate exceeds the growth rate of GDP each
period, it is consistent with the debt-GDP ratio rising without bound,
as long as the growth rate of the debt does not equal or exceed the
(after-tax) interest rate.  The reason why an arbitrarily high (and
rising) debt-GDP ratio is not inconsistent with government solvency
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is that it is assumed implictly that the outstanding stock of debt is
part of the (lump-sum) tax base that permits that same stock of debt
to be serviced!  The argument assumes that this is possible without
the taxes and transfers losing their non-distortionary, lump-sum
character.  The private sector does not perceive the link between the
debt they own and the taxes levied on them to service that debt.  If
we rule out such fiscal Nirvanas, the tighter constraint (if the after-
tax interest rate exceeds the growth rate in the long-run), that the
government debt cannot grow faster than the real resource base of
the economy, and that the debt-GDP ratio therefore must remain
bounded, must be imposed as a characteristic of any feasible fiscal-
financial-monetary program.
When, under current (planned or expected) policies, the
government’s solvency constraint is violated, a number of policy
options exist.  The first policy option is to boost current and future
primary surpluses, either by cutting public spending or by raising tax
and non-tax revenues.  The second policy option is to increase
current and future seigniorage.  The scope for seigniorage to close
the solvency gap is limited by two considerations.  First, as long as
we are on the increasing-yield section of the seigniorage Laffer
curve, a policy of increasing real seigniorage by raising the growth
rate of the nominal stock of base money will, sooner or later, exact
the price of higher inflation.  Second, even the maximal feasible
seigniorage revenue may not be sufficient to close the solvency gap.
The third policy option is to default on some or all of the public
debt, internal and/or external.
2.5.  Primary Gaps
For any initial government debt-GDP ratio at time t, t-1b 2, and any
target future government debt-GDP ratio N>0 periods later, t-1+Nb 3,
one can calculate the magnitude of the constant (augmented)
primary surplus-GDP ratio that would get the economy from the
initial debt-GDP ratio to the target at the required date.  Call this the
required primary surplus-GDP ratio.  One can also project the future
(augmented) primary surpluses that are likely to materialise under
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current (or counterfactual) policies and calculate that constant
primary surplus whose present discounted value would be the same
as the present discounted value of these projected primary surpluses.
Call this the actual primary surplus-GDP ratio.  The difference
between the required and the actual primary surpluses is the
primary gap xv (see Blanchard [1990], Blanchard et al [1990]).  The
primary gap shows the average correction that will have to be made
to the primary surplus-GDP ratio over the N-period time interval
starting in period t,  in order to achieve the debt-GDP target by the
target date.
For instance, the one-period primary gap that just stabilises the
debt-GDP ratio is the excess of the primary surplus that would just
stabilise the debt-GDP ratio in period t over the primary surplus
planned or expected for period t.  This, equal to the difference
between on the one hand the product of the initial public debt-GDP
ratio and the excess of the current period real interest rate over the
growth rate of real GDP, and on the other hand the sum of the
current period’s primary surplus-GDP ratio and the current period’s
seigniorage revenue-GDP ratio.xvi
When the long-run rate of interest exceeds the long-run growth
rate of GDP, we can define the permanent primary gap or solvency
gap.  The solvency gap is given by the difference between on the one
hand the product of the initial public debt-GDP ratio and the excess
of the long-run real interest rate over the long-run growth rate of real
GDP, and on the other hand the sum of the long-run projected
primary surplus-GDP ratio and the long-run projected seigniorage
revenue-GDP ratio.xvii
The solvency gap is an ex-ante measure only.  Ex-post any
positive gap will be closed, through higher future realised primary
surpluses or higher future realised seigniorage revenues than were
allowed for in the projections, through lower than expected long-run
real interest rates or higher than expected long-run real growth rates
or through default.  The solvency gap therefore measures the
permanent increase in the primary surplus-GDP ratio that will have
to be generated in order to avoid a default, given the long-run
19
projected seigniorage revenues and the long-run projected interest
rates and growth rates.
While the definition of the solvency gap is simple, its
implementation is likely to be something of a nightmare, as it
requires the following: (1) the estimation of the long-run real rate of
interest and of the long-run real rate of growth and (2) the prediction
of long-run seigniorage-GDP and primary surplus-GDP ratios under
some plausible (or benchmark) policy or policies and for some
acceptable scenario(s) for the behaviour of the external economic
environment and other relevant exogenous variables.
A tempting short-cut would be to replace the unobservable
permanent expected seigniorage-GDP and primary surplus-GDP
ratios by some observable proxies like the recent average behaviour
of the actual seigniorage-GDP and primary surplus-GDP ratios.  An
example of such an ad-hoc approximation would be to replace the
permanent primary surplus and seigniorage ratios by their current
values.  This would yield the myopic solvency gap.xviii
A simple spread-sheet program (see eg Buiter [1993b]) can be
used to calculate primary gaps for any time horizon given the
following inputs: the initial government debt-GDP ratio, projected
future real interest rates and real growth rates, projected future
(augmented) primary government surpluses and projected future
seigniorage (as fractions of GDP).  It is unfortunate that for many of
the countries considered in this study (including most of the FSU
countries), reliable data on the initial government debt and on
current and past government (augmented) primary surpluses are not
yet available.
2.6.  The Long View Again
The importance of taking the long view can be illustrated by
considering the way in which the current (and near-future) values of
the government’s primary surplus can be doctored to create a
mistaken impression of fiscal soundness and sustainability.  Similar
points can be made about the government’s financial deficit or any
of its “corrected” measures.  The expression for the current value of
the primary surplus, tS  4, is given below.  T denotes government
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taxes net of transfer payments and subsidies, N* is the foreign
currency value of net foreign aid inflows, E is the nominal spot
exchange rate, C is government consumption spending, F is the gross
cash return on the government capital stock, PRIV is privatisation
proceeds and A is gross domestic capital formation by the
government.
Failure to pay state pensions on time increases the current
value of T (taxes net of transfers and subsidies).  If pension arrears
have to be made up in due course in present value terms, the
solvency of the government is not improved by such arrears.
Bringing forward tax payments from a future fiscal year into the
current one also will not improve the government’s finances in any
fundamental way.
Sequestrations and salary arrears to government employees
temporarily depress C (government consumption spending).  If, in
due course, the sequestrations are reversed and the salary arrears are
made good, there is no impact on the present value of current and
future government cash flows.  This is what seems to have happened
in Russia during 1995 and early in 1996, in the run-up to the
presidential elections.
Bringing forward privatisation (an increase in PRIV) also
increases the conventionally measured primary surplus.  Privatisation
(the sale of existing government assets) is a financing item that
belongs below the line.  Since the stock of government assets that
can be privatised is given (or rather can only be augmented by
government capital formation, A) privatisation itself (the asset sale)
can only generate a temporary improvement in the government’s
cash flow.  Privatisation can have a lasting effect on the public
finances only if the privatisation proceeds exceed the present
discounted value of the future stream of revenues (F) the government
would have earned had the assets remained in the public sector.  It is
of course perfectly possible that the future stream of F (conditional
on the asset having remained in the public sector) would have been
t t t t
*
t t t tS   T  +  E N  -  C  +  F  +  PRIV  -  Aº
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mainly negative for the privatised assets: the government might have
had to make good the losses of the state enterprises it owned.  This is
not inconsistent with the government getting positive privatisation
revenues, as the value of the privatised resources under private
ownership can exceed their continuation value in the public sector.
If pre-privatisation F is negative and if privatisation is not
accompanied by an increase in efficiency (or an enhanced capacity
to exploit market power), the government may find itself paying
future subsidies (smaller future values of T )  that match the increase
in F produced by privatisation.  Either way, the link between current
PRIV and future F and T must be recognised in assessing the long-
run budgetary implications of privatisation.
A common tactic by governments faced with an urgent need for
budgetary retrenchment is to slash the general government capital
formation program, thus reducing A.  Infrastructure investment
(together with maintenance and repairs, which are part of C) tends to
be a soft target for finance ministers looking for blood.  To the extent
that the spending is merely postponed rather than cut permanently,
the improvement in the government’s finances is only temporary and
the effect on the present value of present and future cash flows will
be small.   If additions to the government capital stock yield a
positive future cash flow, current cuts in A will be followed by
future reductions in F.  Even if public sector capital formation does
not yield a direct cash return (through user fees etc) it may, if it is
socially productive, increase the future tax base (for income taxes,
VAT, corporate profit taxes etc), thus making future values of T
larger than they would have been otherwise.
Just as bank regulators are faced with the problem of off-
balance sheet assets and liabilities held by the institutions they are
supervising, so those charged with the need to supervise government
finances are faced with an increasing variety of contingent claims and
liabilities held by governments.  Loan guarantees, export credit
guarantees, deposit insurance and foreign exchange guarantees are
but some of the more common options owned or written by
governments (see eg Mody and Patro [1995]).  Pricing such
contingent claims is a daunting task, but if the scope of these
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activities continues to increase, there really is no way around it.  In
New Zealand the government is now legally bound to present a
comprehensive public sector balance sheet which includes explicit
valuations of many of the more standard contingent claims and
liabilities.  These contingent liabilities would be added to the stock
of interest-bearing public debt in the calculation of the primary gaps.
Ideally, similar valuations should be made for the non-standard
contingent claims on the government, including its social security
health and retirement programs, government pension schemes.  The
approach could even be extended to the uncertain future streams of
tax receipts, transfer payments and subsidies.  Even crude
approximations, like discounting expected future cash flows using
risk-free discount rates, would be an improvement over the current
practice of throwing in the towel without even putting up a fight.
2.7.  Seigniorage
Governments can appropriate real resource by issuing intrinsically
valueless (fiat) money, provided private agents believe that fiat
money will offer them a competitive rate of return (including saved
transactions costs) over the planned holding period.  A government
can raise the attractiveness to private agents of its fiat money by
paying interest on it, by declaring it legal tender, by requiring certain
transactions (say tax payments) to be made with it and by making the
use of other transactions media costly or even illegal.  Since the
private (and social) marginal cost of producing fiat money is
(approximately) zero the government must have some monopoly
power over its issuance if it is going to gain command over real
resources by varying its quantity.
While the terms “seigniorage” and “inflation tax” are often
used interchangeably, this is a dangeours habit, as the two concepts
are quite distinct.  By seigniorage, I mean the resources
appropriated by the government by expanding the nominal monetary
base.  This resource measure of seigniorage (as a fraction of GDP),
denoted s, is given by equation (3), where Ht denotes the nominal
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stock of base money outstanding at the beginning of period t+1, Q is
real GDP and P the GDP deflator.
In what follows, I treat the monetary base as non-interest-
bearing.  This need not be the case for commercial bank reserves
held with the central bank.  In Hungary, for instance, near-market
interest rates are paid on such reserves.  The corrections that must be
made to the analysis that follows when commercial bank reserves
held with the central bank bearing interest are straightforward.
There is a closely related concept, occasionally also referred to
in the literature as seigniorage, which defines the interest burden
forgone by the government through its ability to issue non-interest-
bearing liabilities.  This concept of interest burden forgone or
opportunity cost measure of seigniorage (as a fraction of GDP),
denoted wt , is given  in equation (4); i denotes the domestic short
nominal interest rate and  ht º Ht / (PtQt)  the base money-GDP ratio,
or the inverse of the income velocity of circulation of base money.
The resource measure of seigniorage and the opportunity cost
measure are related by the following identity: the present discounted
value of current and future seigniorage equals the present discounted
value of the current and future interest burden foregone (roughly the
operating profits of the central bank), minus the initial stock of base
money:
A third notion of  seigniorage is the Central Bank’s budgetary
contribution to the general government.  From the point of view of
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the approach taken in this paper, the Central Bank’s budgetary
contribution to the general government is an intra-government
transaction that is of no interest.
The inflation tax is generally defined as the reduction in the
real value of the outstanding stock of base money due to increases in
the general price level.  Thus, the inflation tax in period t, as a
fraction of GDP, tpt, is given by
The inflation tax and seigniorage are related by the identity
given in equation (6):
In the short-run, seigniorage can exceed the inflation tax to the
extent that there is positive real growth or to the extent that the
income velocity of circulation of base money falls.
If there exists a stable base money demand function and if we
are able to predict the arguments in the base money demand function
for the period of interest, we can provide a map between the
seigniorage revenue extracted by the government and the rate of
inflation.  I illustrate this with an example of a simple small open
economy with an ad-hoc money demand function.  Let real money
demand be a negative function of the domestic short nominal interest
rate (representing the domestic financial margin of substitution
between non-interest-bearing currency and short interest-bearing
debt) and the expected rate of depreciation of the currency ee
(representing the direct international currency substitution margin
(see eg van Aarle and Budina 1995])).
t t
t -1
t t
t
t t
t -1  
H
P Q
  
(1 + )(1 + g )
h          pt p
p
p
º º
(5)
t
t t
t t
t -1 t t
t
t
t -1 t  
(1+ )(1+ g ) - 1
(1+ )(1+ g )
h  +  h    +  
g
1+ g
h  +  hs
p
p
t pº
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ º
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷D D
(6)
ln lnt
t+1 t+1
t
t+1 t+1
t t
eH
P Q
  h
(1+ )(1+ g )
 =   -  (1+ i ) -  (1+ )
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ º
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
p
a b d e
(7)
25
The domestic nominal interest is the domestic real interest rate
plus the expected rate of inflation.  The rate of nominal exchange
rate depreciation is the rate of real exchange rate depreciation plus
the domestic-foreign inflation differential.  If we can project the real
exchange rate, the foreign rate of inflation and the domestic real
interest rate, then the monetary base-GDP ratio is uniquely (and
negatively) related to the domestic expected rate of inflation.
Consider a steady state, with constant values of the domestic
real interest rate, the growth rate of real GDP, the foreign rate of
inflation and the real exchange rate.  Expectations are realised.
Seigniorage as a function of the rate of inflation exhibits the long-run
seigniorage Laffer curve given in equation (8), with seigniorage first
rising with inflation and, then declining and asymptotically going to
zero for very high rates of inflation.xix
When the demand for money is sensitive to the (expected) rate
of inflation, the inflation tax is distortionary, like every other real-
world tax, transfer or subsidy.  The normative neoclassical theory of
public finance might seem to imply that, in general, a (constrained)
optimal design of fiscal policy will use all distortionary tax
instruments.   Efficiency requires that the excess burdens imposed by
the various distortionary taxes be equalised at the margin.  This
might seem to create a presumption that countries with well-
developed direct and indirect tax systems therefore could be
expected to make less use of the inflation tax than countries with
less efficient revenue administrations and more relaxed public
attitudes towards tax evasion. The (constrained) optimal inflation
rates might therefore be expected to vary across time and across
countries as tax bases, tax administration and tax ethics vary.  This
optimal seigniorage argument for differential national inflation rates
needs to be qualified, however, even as a purely theoretical
proposition, as Friedman’s optimal quantity of money result, that the
s p a b p =  [(1+ )(1+ g) - 1] e   -  (1+ )¢ (8)
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opportunity cost of money should be brought down to zero, turns
out to be remarkably robust.xx
Seigniorage in a currency board system
There appears to be quite wide-spread lack of clarity about how (or
in what sense) the government obtains revenues through seigniorage.
A frequent comment on  earlier versions of this paper was that the
definition of seigniorage used in this paper made no sense because
under a currency board system the central bank does not extend
domestic credit to the (general) government and therefore the
(general) government could not be said to get revenues from the
issuance of base money under a currency board system.
This argument contains two errors.  First, it confuses domestic
credit expansion by the central bank (net lending by the central bank
to the general government) with the net budgetary transfer from the
central bank to the general government sector.  Second, it fails to
consolidate the central bank with the general government.
As regards the second of these points, the central bank is the
monetary agent of the state (and often a key quasi-fiscal agent of the
state as well).  The central bank’s ability to issue non-interest-
bearing liabilities is the government’s ability to issue non-interest-
bearing liabilities.  If the government (the consolidated general
government and central bank) did not have the ability to issue
interest-bearing debt it would have to choose between raising taxes,
cutting expenditures, issuing interest-bearing liabilities and running
down foreign exchange reserves.
As regards the first point, if we look at the balance sheet and
budget identity of the central bank in isolation, it soon becomes
clear how the government obtains resources when the central bank
issues base money, even in the case of a currency board.
Stylised Central Bank Balance Sheet
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Assets Liabilities
DCG (Domestic credit to the
          general government)
H  (Base money)
DCP  (Domestic credit to the
          private sector)
DCB  (Interest-bearing
           central bank debt)
ER*  (Official foreign
           exchange reserves)
 NWCB (Central bank net
               worth)
The stylised balance sheet shown above is self-explanatory.
Central bank net worth equals the value of its assets minus the value
of its liabilities.  There are non-interest-bearing liabilities (the
monetary base) and interest-bearing liabilities, DCB bearing an
interest rate iCB.  Assets include domestic assets and official foreign
exchange reserves, R*.  Domestic assets consist of credit to the
general government, DCG, bearing an interest rate iG and credit to
the private sector, DCP, bearing an interest rate iP.  The interest rate
on official foreign exchange reserves is i* and the spot exchange rate
is E.
D D D D DH D E R D E FC B C B+ - - - ºD C D CG P * (9a)
C B c b C B G G P P * * C B C BD E F   i D  -  i D C  -  i DC - E i R  +  T  +  Cº (9b)
The right-hand side of the central bank budget identity given in
equation (9b), DEFCB, is the financial deficit of the central bank.
TCB is the net budgetary contribution of the central bank to the
general government and CCB are the current expenses of running the
central bank.
A pure currency board has two defining characteristics:  there
is an irrevocably fixed exchange rate and there is no domestic credit
expansion, that is no net lending to the general government sector or
to the private sector, so DCG = DCP = DDCG = DDCP = 0, and the
monetary base is fully backed by international reserves.  The central
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bank’s balance sheet simplifies to the one shown below, while its
budget identity becomes the one given in equations (10a,b).
Stylised Currency Board Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
ER*  (Official foreign
         exchange reserves)
H  (Base money)
DCB  (Interest-bearing
          central bank debt)
NWCB (Central bank net
             worth)
On the right-hand side of equation (10b), the interest paid on
the central bank’s interest-bearing debt and the interest earned on its
foreign assets can be taken as given at a point in time.  So are the
expenses of running the bank.  Consider first the case where the
central bank has no interest-bearing liabilities (DCB =DDCB=0).  If
the central bank builds up foreign exchange reserves, it either issues
base money or it reduces its net budgetary transfer to the Treasury.
While, by definition, there is no domestic credit expansion under a
currency board system, this does not mean that there is no net
budgetary transfer (positive or negative) to the Treasury.  This
argument is not materially affected if the central bank issues interest-
bearing liabilities in addition to base money: for the central bank to
be solvent, its outstanding net interest-bearing debtxxi must be equal
to the present discounted   value   of   its   current   and   future
D D DH +  D  -  E R   DEFCB * CBº (10a)
C B cb C B * * CB CBDEF   i D - E i R  +  T  +  Cº (10b)
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primary   surpluses -(TCB + CCB) plus the present discounted value of
its current and future issues of base money.
A broader view of the inflation tax
The inflation tax of this section is perhaps more accurately referred
to as the (narrowly defined) anticipated inflation tax.  Anticipated
inflation can influence the government’s budgetary position through
other channels.  The most important of these is the Olivera-Tanzi
effect through which a higher rate of inflation erodes the real value
of taxes subject to a collection lag.xxii  The reason is that such
deferred tax payments often are neither index-linked nor have a
market interest rate reflecting anticipated inflation attached to them.
In addition to using the anticipated inflation tax (broadly
defined), the government can improve its real financial net worth by
reducing the real value of its outstanding domestic currency-
denominated fixed interest rate debt through unanticipated inflation.
The effect of an unexpected increase in the current and/or future rate
of inflation on the market value of the domestic-currency-
denominated non-indexed fixed-rate debt increases with the
remaining term to maturity of the debt.xxiii  Even with a variable
interest rate, very short maturity debt can have its real value eroded
by an unanticipated increase in the price level.  Also, if nominal
domestic costs are sticky, the CPI will be flexible in an open
economy through the import component of the consumption bundle.
In a small open economy, a price level jump can be engineered
through a discrete (or maxi-) devaluation.  The ability to impose
unanticipated inflation tax levies on the national debt may be as
important as the discretionary use of the anticipated inflation tax for
a number of countries with high public debt GDP ratios and a
doubtful capacity for generating significant and sustained primary
surpluses.  For such countries, the case for a de jure (through a
(partial) “consolidation” or default by some other name) or de facto
(through an inflation surprise or an unexpected devaluation) capital
levy on the public debt may well become irresistible.  If a de jure
public debt repudiation turns out to be politically unacceptable, a
fierce burst of inflation and a maxi-devaluation may well be the only
way to re-impose ex-post consistency on the public accounts.
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3. SOME NUMBERS
3.1.  Seigniorage
While few people are likely to lie awake about seigniorage for most
EU countries (see Buiter [1995a] and Grilli [1989a,b]), the same
cannot be said for some of the transition economies.  Of the six East-
European countries, shown in Table 1, only Hungary approaches the
seigniorage performance of the 11 most advanced EU members.
Poland approximates the performance of the least developed EU
countries, Portugal and Greece.  The Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic raise more than 3% of GDP through seigniorage.  So does
Hungary, if the conventional monetary base measure (domestic
currency in circulation plus banks’ reserves with the central bank) is
used.  However, Hungary is the only country in our sample where
near-market interest rates are paid on commericial bank reserves with
the central bank.  This suggests that domestic currency in circulation
alone constitutes the base for seigniorage.  On this measure, Hungary
extracted less than 1% of GDP in seigniorage during 1994.
Of the six FSU countries, shown in Table 2, only Estonia, with
its currency board, raises seigniorage comparable to the EU
countries. The Ukraine relies most on seigniorage, with a figure of
more than 11% of GDP for 1994.  Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic
and the Russian Federation all raised more than 5% of GDP through
seigniorage in 1994.
With conventional tax bases as weak as they are in countries
like Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and
Ukraine, continued reliance on seigniorage as a non-trivial source of
revenue seems unavoidable.  The question then is what the need to
extract, on a continuing basis, say 5% of GDP through seigniorage,
implies for the inflation targets that the authorities should set
themselves.xxiv
Unfortunately, the data base at my disposal is not good enough
to estimate, with any degree of precision, reasonably robust base
money (or domestic currency) demand functions.  The time series are
too short (and too much affected by parameter instability despite
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their shortness) and there is too much unobservable cross-sectional
heterogeneity to allow for confident time-series, cross-section or
panel data estimation.
An attempt to estimate a long-run seigniorage Laffer curve
directly using pooled data for all 12 countries in my sample is
reported in a longer version of this paper (Buiter [1996]).  The least
objectionable estimates suggests that the long-run seigniorage
maximising rate of inflation is about 137% per annum and that the
maximal long-run seigniorage -GDP ratio is about 3.65%. Van Aarle
and Budina [1995] using longer quarterly time-series, estimate
currency and base money demand functions of the semi-logarithmic
variety (as in equation (7)xxv).  Their best equation (currency demand
in Poland), has a long-run semi-elasticity of currency demand with
respect to the rate of inflation of -0.21 (with a t-statistic of -3.09)
and a long-run semi-elasticity with respect to the rate of currency
depreciation of -0.54 (with a t-statistic of -0.11).  These point
estimates implyxxvi, that the long-run seigniorage maximising rate of
inflation is about 133% per annum if (statistically insignificant)
international direct currency substitution is taken into account, and
about 476% per annum if it is not. Maximal seigniorage is about
3.7% of GDP if international direct currency substitution is not
taken into account and just over 2% of GDP if international direct
currency substitution is allowed for.  It goes without saying that it is
very unlikely that the seigniorage maximising rate of inflation will
ever be the optimal rate.
In view of the importance of seigniorage revenue for countries
in the early stages of transition, the estimation of more robust base
money and domestic currency demand functions should have high
research priority.
3.2. Debts and Deficits
A quick first check for quasi-fiscal deficits
In most transition economies, especially in the financially less
developed and sophisticated ones, it is safe to interpret any excess of
domestic credit expansion (DCE) by the central bank (the increase
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in the stock of base money minus the official settlements balance,
roughly equal to the increase in the central bank’s external assets or
international reserves) over the financial deficit of the general
government to be prima facie evidence of fiscal and/or quasi-fiscal
deficits of the central bank.  From equations (9a,b) it follows that
The last two terms on the right-hand-side of equation (11),
DCP +DEFCB, are the augmented financial deficit of the central
bank, treating all central bank net credit extended to the non-general
government sectors, DCP, as de facto quasi-fiscal transfer payments.
This augmented financial deficit of the central bank equals DCE
minus credit extended by the central bank to the general
government, DCG, plus the increase in the interest-bearing liabilities
of the central bank, DCB.  If the data are available to calculate the
augmented financial deficit of the central bank directly, either as
DCP+DEFCB or as DCE-DCG+DCB, of course no further
approximations are required. If these data are not all available, we
can estimate a lower bound on the augmented financial deficit of the
central bank if we can assume (1) that central bank did not issue a
significant amount of interest-bearing liabilities (DCB#0) and (2) that
the financial deficit of the general government is at least as large as
the credit extended by the central bank to the general government.
This second assumption would be violated if the general government
were retiring domestic or external interest-bearing debt held outside
the central bank or if it were selling assets (say through
privatisation).  Retiring public debt does not appear to have been a
common occurrence in the transition economies.  Privatisation has
been a source of revenue in many transition economies, but the
amounts involved have typically been rather small.  If the two
assumptions are satisfied, the augmented financial deficit of the
central bank is at least as large as the excess of domestic credit
expansion by the central bank over the financial deficit of the
general government.
DCE  H -  E R   DC  -  D  +  DC  +  DEF* G CB P CBº ºD D D D D (11)
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In Tables 3 and 4, I check to which extent central bank dce
exceeds the reported general government financial deficit figures.
For reference, the seigniorage figures are also included.
The figures for the six East-European countries are given in
Table 3.  On the basis of these figures, only Romania is a clear
candidate for sizeable quasi-fiscal deficits, given in the fourth row
for Romania. Note, however, that the excess of central bank dce over
the general government financial deficit only provides a lower bound
on the augmented financial deficit of the central bank:  it is
sufficient, but not necessary, to start worrying about quasi-fiscal
deficits.
The figures for the six FSU countries are given in Table 4.
Estonia experienced huge reserve inflows in connection with the
creation of its currency board in 1993.  Even so, there may be
valuation problems associated with its reserve inflows.  Kazakhstan
(for which only one year of data ?  1994) is available, passes the
plausibility test because of a reported 6.9% of GDP quasi-fiscal
deficit in 1994 ?  the only quasi-fiscal deficit reported by the Fund
for any year and any country.  The Kyrgyz Republic also reports
large and wild reserve flows.  Reserve valuation problems may again
have contributed to some pretty wild dce(1) numbers.  For
Lithuania, dce(2) exceeded the deficit in 1993, and for the Ukraine
dce(1) exceeded the deficit in 1994.
Both quasi-fiscal deficits and contingent deferred fiscal deficits
are likely to be important in many of the FSU countries, and in
Romania and Bulgaria.  Even the advanced transition economies (the
Baltic republics, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the
Slovak Republic) are no exception, as the contingent claims on the
government represented by likely insolvencies in the financial sector
should be allowed for in any medium-term fiscal-financial strategy.
The absence of any quantitative information on such current and
future contingent claims on the public purse makes it very hard, if
not impossible, to perform a meaningful analysis of the sustainability
of the fiscal-financial-monetary program.  What follows assumes that
unreported quasi-fiscal deficits and contingent deferred fiscal deficits
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are indeed zero.  That assumption is likely to be wide off the mark in
many cases.
Real growth rates and real interest rates
Two key ingredients in the sustainability analysis framework
outlined in Section 2 are future growth rates of real GDP and the
future real interest rate on domestic government debt.  In the hope
(but not the expectation) that the past can be a guide to the future,
figures on the realised magnitudes of these two variables are
presented in Table 5.
Whatever one may think of the quality of the real growth
figures as indicators of the actual behavior of the real economy in the
past, it is clear that they are bound to be very poor guides to future
real growth.  The ex-post real interest rates recorded in Table 5,
should also be taken with a pinch of salt, as a guide to either past or
future. With the exception of the last year or so for Bulgaria,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic, such
nominal interest rates as are reported are unlikely to represent the
marginal cost of voluntary domestic lending to the government.
More important, the ex-post real interest rates recorded in Table 5
are, again with the five exceptions already mentioned, likely to be
extremely poor guides to the ex-ante real cost of future voluntary
domestic government borrowing in the countries concerned.
Debts, deficits and primary surpluses
Subject to all the aforementioned qualifications, we can now pull
together those key ingredients of a fiscal sustainability analysis that
are available.
I was unable to obtain data on the debt of the consolidated
general government and central bank.  The data in Tables 6 and 7
refer only to general government debt (even then there are some
lacunae).  This can clearly lead to distortions from the point of view
of the sustainability analysis outlined in Section 2 of the paper.  In
Hungary, for instance, a large part of the general government debt is
owed to the central bank.  The debt of the consolidated general
government and central bank therefore looks quite different
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(particularly in terms of the breakdown between domestic and
foreign debt) from that of the general government sector.  Moreover,
while much of the general government debt is at preferential rates,
interest rates on the consolidated debt are close to market levels,
reflecting the larger share of external debt in the consolidated debt.
I recognise the problem, but cannot remedy it with the data available
to me.
Considering first the six East-European countries, we find a
wide variety of circumstances, as can be seen from Table 6.
Bulgaria is extremely highly indebted, with a debt-GDP ratio at
the end of 1994 of 165%, more than two-thirds of which is external
debt.  During 1994, however, Bulgaria managed a primary surplus of
7.0% of GDP.  If there are no hidden quasi-fiscal and contingent
deferred fiscal deficits, the 7.0% of GDP primary surplus would, if
maintained indefinitely, be consistent with long-run solvency as long
as the long-run real interest rate does not exceed the long-run
growth rate of real GDP by more than 4.2% per annum.  Clearly, a
permanent 7% of GDP primary surplus would be a first in the history
of mankind.  If Bulgaria could extract 3% of GDP in seigniorage in
the long-run, the picture looks slightly less unrealistic.  In addition
one could hope for a long-run real growth rate of about 4 to 5% per
year and an annual long-run real interest rate of no more than 6 to
7%. Under these conditions the required primary surplus plus
seigniorage would between 1.65 and 4.95% of GDP, which may not
be infeasible. Finally, on the basis of the data up to the beginning of
1995, Bulgaria looked a likely candidate for some serious external
debt restructuring, which would further improve its medium- and
long-term fiscal-financial position.  This has indeed happened
subsequently.
For the Czech Republic, I only have central government debt.
Unless provincial and local governments and the various off-budget
funds greatly inflate the total, Czech government debt is tiny (at
15.6% of GDP for the central government in 1994).  Its 1994
primary surplus is also tiny (0.1% of GDP) but that is hardly
worrying. The Czech Republic also satisfies the Maastricht debt and
deficit criteria (general government gross debt no more than 60% of
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GDP and the general government financial deficit no more than 3%
of GDP).  In 1995 and 1996, there has been some slippage in Czech
fiscal control: despite a booming economy, the general government
deficit rose by more than two percentage points of GDP.
With the exception of Bulgaria (prior to its external debt
restructuring), Hungary may well be in the worst fiscal shape of any
of the six East European countries.  With a high debt-to-GDP ratio
of 88.4% in 1994 and a small primary surplus of 0.4% of GDP in
that year, it would have to hope for a very favourable constellation
of low real interest rates and high growth rates of real GDP to make
a continuation of the current primary surplus performance consistent
with long-run solvency.  Hungary satisfies neither the Maastricht
debt criterion nor, with a general government deficit of 6.3% of GDP
in 1994, the Maastricht deficit criterion.
Poland, with a debt-to-GDP ratio in 1994 of 78.5% and a
primary surplus of 1.5% of GDP appears to be in better fiscal shape
than Hungary.  With a deficit of 2.5% of GDP it also satisfies the
Maastricht deficit criterion.  As its debt-GDP ratio appears to be
declining quite rapidly, it might be entitled to “Irish” treatment as
regards the interpretation of the Maastricht debt criterion.
Romania exited from Communism with a negligible debt-GDP
ratio.  At the end of 1994 its debt-GDP ratio of 21.1% and its
primary surplus of 0.3% do not suggest any solvency problems.  The
only qualification has to be the possibility of a hidden quasi-fiscal
and contingent deferred fiscal deficit.  Romania satisfies both the
debt and the deficit criteria of Maastricht.
The Slovak Republic has a low but rapidly rising debt-GDP
ratio, which stands at 36.4% of GDP at the end of 1994.  The
primary surplus of 2.9% of GDP and the deficit of 1.4% of GDP for
1994 suggest the absence of any solvency problems.  Both the debt
and the deficit criteria of Maastricht were met at the end of 1994.
Turning to the six FSU countries, it is clear from Table 7 that
the only one with a serious debt problem at the end of 1994, is the
Russian Federation.  The Russian debt is mainly external, much of it
accounted for by inherited USSR debt (approximately US$70 billion
when the USSR collapsed in 1991).  Putting together the figures on
38
the Russian debt with the large primary deficits (8.21% of GDP in
1994), it is clear that even if Russia continues to extract as much as
5.0% of GDP in seigniorage (which seems unlikely), the country is
insolvent without either a significant reduction in the primary deficit
or a major write-down in the external debt.  The true situation is
actually likely to be worse than that represented in Table 7, as it is
assumed there that there is no quasi-fiscal or contingent deferred
fiscal deficit, which is certainly incorrect in the case of the Russian
Federation.
Russia’s recent successes in rescheduling and renegotiating her
external debt have certainly helped improve the rather dismal picture
as of the end of 1994, when the total external debt stood at
US$119.9 billion.  In November 1995, the London Club of
commercial bank creditors rescheduled debts totalling US$25.5
billion over 25 years. In April 1996, the Paris Club of bilateral
creditor nations agreed to reschedule the repayment of $40 billion of
debts over 25 years.  The Paris Club deal involves a six-year grace
period on the repayment of principal and is likely to save billions of
dollars in debt repayments in the short-term.  I have not been able to
find an estimate of its total effect on the present discounted value of
all future debt obligations. Together with the recently signed
agreement with the IMF for US$10 billion in loans over three years,
the external cash flow constraints on the Russian economy have
certainly been relaxed somewhat in the short-term.
The Ukraine is the only other FSU country with a non-
negligible external debt (at 28.7% of GDP in 1994).  In view of its
large primary deficit, it is clear that only a major reduction in the
primary deficit can restore solvency in the Ukraine.  It certainly
won’t be possible to continue to extract the 1994 level of 11% of
GDP in seigniorage, and even a complete write-down of the external
debt would not save much more than 2% of GDP in interest
payments in the long-run.  While there ought to be some scope for
reducing general government expenditure (at 52.9% of GDP in 1994
and estimated to have been around 46% of GDP in 1995), it is hard
to see how the Ukraine will be able to manage without a sizeable
inflow of external resources.
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As far as I can tell, the internal public debt of the FSU
countries was small at the end of 1994, although for most of them
the entry under internal debt was “Not Available” rather than
“Negligible”.  In a number of FSU countries, notably Russia,
issuance of Treasury Bills was growing rapidly.  The Russian
domestic TB market is segmented from the external one, and
considerably higher rates of return are available to domestic TB
holders.
Subject to the “quasi-fiscal and contingent deferred fiscal
deficit” qualification, the public finances of Estonia look very sound,
while one has to withhold judgement on Lithuania until it becomes
clear whether its recent primary deficit is likely to be temporary or
permanent.
Kazakhstan appears to be in rather bad shape and the Kyrgyz
Republic in very bad shape, even if no (further) quasi-fiscal and
contingent deferred fiscal horrors are uncovered.  Neither of these
countries has any sizeable external debt to write down or
(apparently) any internal debt.  Both countries have tax revenue
levels that are already dangerously low.  Again it is difficult to see a
feasible fiscal-financial-monetary program for these two countries
that does not involve a large inward transfer of external resources.
4. SOME SPECIAL FISCAL ISSUES ENCOUNTERED BY
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
A closer look at the expenditure and revenue figures for the 12
countries under consideration prompts the following eight
reflections.
4.1. The Collapse of Government Revenues in Some Recent 
Transition Economies
A startling fact is the collapse of government (especially central
government) revenues in some of the countries that have only
recently initiated their transitions and that have not yet succeeded in
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achieving macroeconomic stabilisation.  Tax revenues as a share of
GDP are falling to levels associated with the most underdeveloped
countries in the world.
As Table 8 makes clear, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic
are firmly in this position.  Lithuania too appears to be raising too
little general government revenue and the Russian Federation is also
rapidly approaching the danger zone.  In October 1996, the IMF
threatened to suspend loan disbursements to Russia, because of a
spectacular failure to meet the tax revenue conditionality.
Surprisingly, if the data are to be believed, general government
revenues appear to be holding up rather well in the Ukraine.  This
may simply reflect the fact that the general government sector still
includes much of the state enterprise sector, as privatisation has been
lagging behind badly in that country.  Another candidate
explanation is that the figures are wrong.  Among the Eastern
European countries, only Romania seems to be heading for a
dangerously low level of government revenue.  Of course, the
structure of government revenues leaves much to be desired in most
transition economies, from the point of view of allocative efficiency,
administrative simplicity and distributive justice.
It seems unlikely that even the barest nightwatchman duties of
the state can be discharged adequately with tax revenues restricted to
17% of GDP.  The very survival of the state is put at risk by very low
tax revenues.  In the revenue-deficient countries the first priority of
the state should be to strengthen its tax revenue bases and improve
the tax collection effort.
The proximate cause of the increase in public sector financial
deficits has been a dramatic decline in public sector current
revenues, especially in the central government sector.  There have
also been significant cuts in public spending in most countries (often
in consumer subsidies (food, household energy, housing), enterprise
subsidies and in public infrastructure investment), but not by enough
to match the decline in revenues and prevent the emergence of
unsustainable financial deficits.
The decline in revenues can be attributed in part to a decline in
the traditional tax bases and in part to a decline in the government’s
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ability to extract revenue from any given base.  The decline in the
traditional tax bases, mainly taxes on turnover and enterprise profits,
mirrors the sharp decline in output that has occurred, without
exception, in the early years of the transition.  In several of the East
European countries the cumulative (measured) output decline over
the period 1990-1992 ranged between 20 and 40%.  Even if the
recorded output decline overstates the true decline in real GDP
(because of an under-recording of output in the “new private sector”,
and especially in the private service industries), the GDP of the
traditional sectors (largely the (former) state enterprise sector) is a
more appropriate indicator of the traditional tax bases, especially for
the enterprise profits tax.
Equally important has been the weakening, and in some cases
the virtual collapse, of the government’s institutional and
administrative capacity for collecting such key traditional revenues
as the business profits tax.  Under central planning, the tax on state
enterprise profits was effectively a business withholding tax.  With
the government setting input and output prices, the tax authorities
had direct knowledge of and access to state enterprise profits.
Transferring these profits to the centre was essentially a simple
accounting transaction, effected through the mono-bank system.
With privatisation, the break-up of the state mono-bank system and
price liberalisation, the information available to the centre
concerning the profitability of the former state enterprises worsened
dramatically and the administrative capacity for transferring profits
from the enterprises to the centre knowledge weakened and in some
cases virtually vanished.  Much of the new private sector falls
outside the net of the enterprise profit tax altogether.  Tax
compliance is generally poor. Avoidance and evasion are rife.
The common tolerance for poor tax compliance is boosted by
the frequently arbitrary nature of assessments and by the many
distortions in the tax system that make for frequent inefficiencies and
inequities.  For instance, high inflation in Poland in 1990 (586% per
annum) combined with historic cost accounting and the taxation of
inventory revaluation profits, meant that accounting profits for tax
purposes wildly overstated true profits (measured, say, on a cash-
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flow basis).  This provided the government with a (strictly
temporary) revenue boost and saddled the enterprise sector with an
sometimes crippling tax burden.  The next year, inflation declined
(to 70% at an annual rate) and with it the revenues from the
enterprise profit tax disappeared (see Schaffer [1992]).
Turnover taxes too, became harder to collect as wholesale and
retail trade were privatised and became more difficult targets for the
revenue authorities.
Attempts are being made to enhance the revenue-raising
capacity of the transition economies.  As regards the enterprise
profits taxes, attempts have been made to re-establish fiscal control
over the former state enterprises and to bring the new private sector
inside the enterprise tax net for the first time.  The turnover taxes are
being supplemented (or replaced) by value added taxes.  With a
narrow base and shot through with exemptions and zero ratings, the
revenues raised by the value added tax have frequently been
disappointing.
The seriousness of the problems that arise when the central
government cannot secure adequate revenues to perform its essential
functions becomes apparent when we consider the history of the
demise of the former Yugoslav Republic.  The refusal of some of the
key Republics to adequately fund the Federal government, and the
inability of the Federal government to raise revenues in recalcitrant
republics without their cooperation was the death knell of the
Federal state.  While the dynamics of disintegration of public
administration and collapse of the capacity to tax are complicated,
there can be no doubt that the capacity to tax is a defining
characteristic of a viable state.
4.2. The Pemature Adoption of OECD Spending Patterns by the 
Advanced Transition Economies
A second striking fact is that a number of the more advanced
transition economies appear to be settling on a level and
composition of public spending that resembles that of the advanced
OECD countries.  Table 9 contains some illustrative figures.
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The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak
Republic all appear to be stuck with levels of general government
spending that are unsustainably high.  This is so even where it is
possible to secure non-inflationary financing for these expenditures.
The distortions and disincentives associated with raising 50% or
more of GDP in current revenues are bound to be formidable in
these still relatively poor and capital-deficient economies.  Hungary
appears to be in especially bad shape from this point of view, with
an almost Swedish-size general government spending program.  It is
doubtful that with levels of productivity and productive efficiency
still well below that of the advanced OECD countries, that even the
advanced transition economies can support an advanced OECD-style
welfare state and supply of public goods and services.xxvii  The fact
that these countries also tend to have an OECD-type demographic
structure (a rapidly greying population) makes the problem even
worse.
Bulgaria too, appears to have general government spending at
an unsustainably high level.  Its spending certainly exceeds its
capacity for non-inflationary financing.  Unlike the other countries
included in Table 9, however, general government spending in
Bulgaria appears to be on a downward path (as a proportion of
GDP).
Of the FSU countries, only Russia and (especially) the Ukraine
appear to be in need of significant further reductions in the share of
general government spending in GDP.
4.3. Fiscal Federalism
When we consider the transition economies with a Federal structure,
it is often unclear whether the main problem is the Federal (Central)
government witholding essential (and officially agreed upon)
resources from the lower-tier authorities or the lower-tier authorities
(ab)using their proximity to the key tax bases to control and
appropriate revenue resources that should go to the Central
authorities.  In support of the former view, it is clear that the Central
authorities have delegated to the lower-tier authorities many
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functions and spending obligations that were previously centralised.
Frequently such mandated tasks and spending obligations have not
been adequately funded, either through direct transfers from the
centre (revenue sharing) or by giving the lower-tier authorities
additional revenue bases.  In support of the latter view, the
experience of the Russian Federation shows that despite the
constitutional position of the main tax collection administrations as
agents of the Federal government, the lower-tier authorities appear
to be able to withhold considerable amounts of revenues from
reaching the centre.
In addition to the official political Federal structure of the
Russian Federation there appears to be an informal industrial
Federal structure which allows certain resource-based revenue-rich
industries (especially oil and natural gas) to act like states-within-the
state. Regaining the ability to enforce constitutionally adopted tax
laws, rules and regulations throughout the entire domain of the state
should be a top priority for the Federal government.
4.4. Revenue Tariffs
The revenue implications of trade reform measures should never be
ignored.  International trade taxes are relatively easy to administer.
Replacing non-auctioned quotas by auctioned quotas or preferably
by tariffs is always a good idea.  While there is no unambiguous
theoretical efficiency case for uniformity of tariff rates in traditional
international trade theory and public finance, there is a strong case
for uniform ad valorem tariff rates without exemptions once we
allow for administration, collection or enforcement costs and for the
rent-seeking behavior and corruption encouraged by multiple tariff
rates and exemptions.  Smuggling of course will always be a problem
with any non-zero tariff.
Transition economies should not be encouraged to cut their
tariffs to levels below, say, 15%, unless adequate alternative revenue
sources or additional spending cuts can be identified. Romania
appears to be an example of a country were import tariffs were
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brought down too rapidly from the point of view of the government’s
revenue needs.
4.5. Fiscal Aspects of Privatisation
Privatisation of state enterprises reduces the information base
available to the tax authorities and weakens or eliminates its
traditional administrative apparatus for collecting the taxes.  When
banks have been privatised and bank supervision and regulation have
been ineffective, another important source of information for the tax
authorities has been lost.  This appears to be an especially acute
problem in the Russian Federation.
Governments can collect revenues from privatisation in two
ways.  First, they can raise revenues by selling the ownership claims
to the state enterprises.  Second, they can tax the privatised
enterprises after privatisation.  This can be done even if the
enterprises are (partly) foreign-owned, if source-based capital
income or profits taxes (say in the form of a witholding tax) are
imposed.xxviii Clearly, the amount of revenue raised from the initial
sale of the assets is not independent of the buyers’ assessment of
what the future tax regime is going to be.  Since governments have
only a very limited capacity to commit themselves not to impose
future taxes, any time-consistent policy will involve lower initial
privatisation revenues and greater reliance on future taxation than
would be optimal if governments could make credible commitments
to future tax levels.
Privatisation can also affect the expenditure side of the
government budget, if privatised enterprises are less effective
lobbyists for government subsidies than their state-owned
predecessors.
4.6. The Shifting of Social Expenditures from the Former State 
Enterprise Sector to the General Government
Under central planning, state enterprises fulfil a number of functions
performed by the general government sector in market economies.
46
These include the provision of public consumption goods and
services to their employees, public investment and the provision of
part of the social safety net.  As the transition proceeds, some of
these functions are transferred from the (former) state enterprises to
the general government.  Others are abandoned by the (former) state
enterprises without being taken over by the general government
sector.
Transferring social expenditure responsibility from the (former)
state enterprises to the general government can create serious
revenue problems for the general government: it was considerably
easier for the pre-transition state enterprises to earmark and mobilise
some of their own resources to discharge these social obligations
than it is for the post-transition general government sector to raise
tax revenues in an efficient and equitable manner to provide an
adequate social safety net.
4.7. Sequestration and ‘Current Arrears’
Sequestration (the withholding from the spending departments by
the ministry of finance of previously authorised funds) should be the
means of public expenditure control of last resort, as its occurrence
is prima facie evidence that normal budgetary processes and
procedures have broken down.  Sequestration impacts on
government procurement, on government wage and salary payments
and on the transfer payments and benefits side of the budget.
Sequestration need not necessarily lead to arrears by the government
to non-government suppliers of current goods and services and to
recipients of government transfer payments, but it will do so if the
spending departments had entered into contracts (or other quasi-
contractual arrangements) on the basis of their previously authorised
budgets. Public sector wage, salary and pension arrears (henceforth
current arrears) have occurred in the Russian Federation.  They were
reduced in the run-up to the Presidential elections, but appear to
have increased again since then.  Such current arrears should be
viewed as seriously as arrears on the internal or external debt of the
government, as they too represent the moral (and sometimes the
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legal) equivalent of a breach of contract.  Furthermore, salary arrears
to the armed forces create the risk of mutiny, which does not appear
to be good politics.
The Fund has, in my view, taken too relaxed a view of
sequestration and current arrears in the past, especially in the
Russian Federation.  In mitigation, it has to be admitted that, in the
case of the Russian Federation, the notion of “previously authorised
funds” has often been very ambiguous, with ministries, lower level
government agencies, high ranking officials (including the president)
claiming the authority to authorise budgetary funds ?  independent of
the Ministry of Finance, or the approved budget (if and when that
existed).  If such is indeed the case, the rectification of both
anomalies (anarchic budgetary appropriation authorisation
procedures and sequestration/ current arrears) should be an essential
component of the conditionality attached to any Fund program.
4.8. The Appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate and the Cost
of External Borrowingxxix
The real domestic resource cost of foreign borrowing (that is the real
interest cost measured in domestic GDP units), rf, equals the foreign
nominal rate of interest paid on the external debt, i*, plus the
proportional rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation minus the
domestic rate of inflation, that is,
Equivalently, the real domestic resource cost of foreign
borrowing can be viewed as equalling the foreign real rate of interest
(the cost of foreign borrowing in terms of foreign GDP units), r*,
plus the proportional rate of real exchange rate depreciation, g, that
is,
f
*
r   
(1 + i )(1+ )
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p
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Thus, given the world real rate of interest, real exchange rate
appreciation (a decline in g) reduces the domestic real resource cost
of foreign borrowing.  Following the massive real depreciations
experienced by many of the transition economies in the very early
phases of their transition, many are now experiencing a strong (albeit
volatile) trend appreciation of their real exchange rates, which
reduces the cost of borrowing abroad (see eg Halpern and Wyplosz
[1995] and Buiter and Lago [1995]).
If there is perfect international financial capital mobility and
uncovered nominal interest rate parity prevails, that is, the domestic
nominal interest rate equals the foreign nominal interest rate plus the
proportional rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation, then the
real domestic resource cost of borrowing abroad is equal to the real
resource cost of borrowing at home.  In a financially small open
economy which takes the foreign real interest r* as parametric, an
appreciation of the real exchange rate therefore reduces the domestic
real rate of interest.
In the reality faced by most transition economies, the domestic
currency cost of foreign borrowing differs from the domestic nominal
rate of interest not just because of the existence of an exchange risk
premium (which can of course be negative) but also because of
capital market segmentation due to capital controls, exchange
controls and other administrative and fiscal interventions in the free
international flow of financial capital.  Nevertheless, unless the
domestic financial market is completely cut-off from the
international financial system, one would expect the expectation of
an appreciation of the real exchange rate to lower not just the real
cost of foreign borrowing but also the domestic real rate of interest.
5. CONCLUSION:  SOME GENERAL LESSONS
I summarise my main conclusions and recommendations as a number
of propositions, grouped under three headings: ‘data’, ‘fiscal policy
design’ and ‘other’.  For reasons of space, not all conclusions and
recommendations could be developed and motivated in the body of
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the paper.  They are nevertheless presented here both because I
consider them important and because they are likely to resonate with
those familiar with the area and its circumstances.
5.1. Data
Proposition 1.  For many of the FSU countries and for some of the
East-European countries, the minimal data set required to evaluate
the sustainability of the fiscal-financial-monetary policy stance is not
available.  From the officially available data on the general
government financial deficit and on the general government primary
deficit, it is often virtually impossible to interpret the economic
significance of the magnitudes of these financial balances, of
variations in them or of differences (across countries) between them.
Under these conditions, policy evaluation and advice can only be
based on  (informed) guesswork.  
Proposition 2.  The fundamental accounting unit that Fund
programs and data collection should focus on is the consolidated
general government and central bank.  The consolidated balance
sheet, (augmentedxxx) financial deficit and (augmented) primary
deficit of this sector are the fundamental building block of any
medium-term or long-term sustainability analysis.  Whatever the
formal status of the central bank, it is essential to recognise it and
treat it as a key financial and (quasi-)fiscal agent of the government.
Proposition 3.  All quasi-fiscal activities of the consolidated general
government and central bank sector should be identified as such, and
the tax or subsidy equivalents of these activities should be recorded
in the accounts.  This is essential as much for the proper assessment
of the allocative implications of the budget as for a proper
interpretation of the financial position of the government.
Proposition 4.  A practical way of estimating the augmented
financial deficit of the consolidated general government and central
bank referred to in Proposition 2, is to add the conventional
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financial deficit of the general government, the conventional
financial deficit of the central bank and the net increase in the
amount of credit extended by the central bank to all sectors other
than the general government.  The assumption underlying this, that
credit extended by the central bank to all sectors other than the
general government is quasi-fiscal in nature, that is, constitutes de
facto grants and subsidies, seems reasonable in the context of the
most transition economies.
Proposition 5.  In order to adopt a longer-term perspective on the
government’s finances it is necessary to make explicit estimates of
the contingent deferred fiscal deficit of the general government, the
(contingent) future claims on the resources of the central bank and
the Treasury stored (and often hidden) in the balance sheets of state
enterprises and of non-government financial and non-financial
enterprises.
Proposition 6.  In order to adopt a longer-term perspective on the
government’s finances, a systematic attempt must be made to identify
and value its most important contingent assets and liabilities.
Proposition 7.  All IMF documents should include only interest
rates that are properly compounded.
This may seem a trivial point, but the failure to observe this
convention invites unnecessary confusion and misinterpretation,
especially during episodes of high inflation.
Proposition 8.  Data on the stocks of internal and external
government debt (including arrears) should be collected and
published as a matter of routine.  This includes information on
maturity structure, currency composition, interest rates, grace
periods and other key features of the debt contracts (fixed rate,
variable rate, bullet etc).
Proposition 9. Data on the stocks of external assets and liabilities of
the nation as a whole (government, private sector and state
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enterprise sector) should be collected and published as a matter of
routine.  The Fund should make estimates of the external assets of
the private sector (including those representing past capital flight)
and evaluate the degree to which these assets (or their earnings) are
(potentially) part of the tax base.  The longer-term fiscal
consequences of capital flight are as important as their short-term
balance of payments and exchange rate implications.
Proposition 10.  The Fund should maintain a centralised fiscal-
financial-monetary data base which is updated after every mission
and Article 4 consultation.  The Fund is the obvious agency to
provide this public good.  Adequate resources should be allocated to
this key activity.
5.2. Fiscal Policy Design
Proposition 11: The imposition of hard budget constraints on
enterprises is a prerequisite for macroeconomic stabilisation.  The
imposition by the central bank and the ministry of finance of hard
budget constraints on the commercial banks is a prerequisite for the
imposition of hard budget constraints by banks on non-financial
enterprises.
Proposition 12: In the advanced transition economies (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic), the dominant
public finance problem seems to be the pursuit of a level and
structure of public spending more commonly associated with the
advanced West-European industrial countries.  The productivity
levels achieved in these four  countries would appear to be too low
to support a West-European-style welfare state.   
Proposition 13:  In early transition economies like Kazakhstan and
the Kyrgyz Republic, but also in Lithuania, the primary public
finance problem seems to be a drastic decline in the government’s
ability to raise tax revenues.  The same problem appears to be
emerging in the Russian Federation.  Surprisingly, the data suggest
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that this is not (yet) a problem in Ukraine.  When a government
cannot tax to finance the essential functions of a modern state, not
just the survival of the government but that of the state itself is
threatened.
Proposition 14: No structural reform measure (such as trade reform
and privatisation) should ever be implemented without considering
its implications for public revenues and expenditures.
Proposition 15: Given the limited amount of administrative capacity
found in many transition economies, the importance of keeping taxes
simple and administratively easy to collect is central.  This means,
for instance, that a VAT levied and collected at each of the
intermediate stages, which brings with it complicated and extensive
need for record keeping by businesses and the need for extensive
record-keeping and cross-checking by the tax officials, should not be
recommended automatically to any transition economy.xxxi   If a VAT
is deemed desirable, it may be preferable to levy and collect at a
single (final) stage, like a retail sales tax on final consumption (see
Mclure [1992] and Tait [1992]).xxxii
Proposition 16.  Tax exemptions undermine revenues, stimulate
rent-seeking and corruption and are likely to distort the allocation of
resources.
The fiscal history of the Russian Federation provides ample
confirmation of the truth of this proposition.
Proposition 17.  Exemptions from import duties (and indeed
virtually every deviation from a uniform ad valorem tariff rate on all
imports) stimulate rent-seeking and corruption and are likely to
distort the allocation of resources.
The history of customs administration and revenues of the
Russian Federation provides ample confirmation of the truth of this
proposition.
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Proposition 18.  Sequestration and internal current arrears should
be viewed with equal seriousness as arrears on internal and external
debt.
Proposition 19.  If further sustained real exchange rate appreciation
can be anticipated for many transition economies, foreign borrowing
(denominated in hard currencies) will tend to be cheaper in real
terms than domestic borrowing.
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ENDNOTES
                                   
i. Running down foreign exchange reserves is counted as a form
of foreign borrowing.
ii. They are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Rumania and the Slovak Republic (for the European I Department);
and Estonia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, the
Russian Federation and Ukraine (for the European II Department).
iii. This function can be viewed alternatively as the application of
its second role, that of providing financial assistance to individual
countries, when the client country is deemed large enough for its
troubles to have systemic externalities.
4. There is a concessional or aid element in most Fund lending, as
the rates paid on drawings on the Fund are undoubtedly lower than
what the drawing country could have expected to pay in the private
loan markets, if it had access to these at all.
5. The national government in turn derives its stabilisation role
from its ability to remove (or at least minimise the incidence and
severity of) liquidity, cash-flow or borrowing constraints on private
sector spending, through the use of taxes, transfer payments,
government borrowing and monetary financing.
6. and possibly of other public sector banks and financial
institutions (such as general or sectoral development banks).
7. From the point of view of the measurement of the financial
deficit of the central bank, the reclassification of quasi-fiscal
transactions into their subsidy and tax equivalents will often merely
shuffle items from the ‘net interest paid’ column to the ‘primary
deficit’ column, without this affecting the magnitude of the financial
deficit. This is the case eg when central bank lending at below
market rates of interest is converted into and recorded as central
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bank lending at imputed market interest rates (reducing ‘net interest
paid’) combined with an explicit interest subsidy (raising the primary
deficit).
viii. When markets are incomplete, not only do the present
discounted value of these net resource transfers matter, but also their
timing.
ix. An example in an American context would be “borrowed
reserves”, which are claims by the central bank on commercial
banks.
x. I elaborate on this in Section 3.2.
xi. Let s Error! Main Document Only. be the conventionally
defined primary surplus as a fraction of GDP, then the adjusted
primary surplus as a fraction of GDP, s, is given by
 Error! Main Document Only.
t t
t t
*
t
t t
t -1
*s  =  s  +  
1 + i - (1 + i )(1 + )
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æ
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where i is the domestic nominal
interest rate, i8 is the foreign nominal interest rate, e is the
proportional rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and
b* is the stock of net foreign liabilities as a fraction of GDP.
xii. Let d  Error! Main Document Only.be the conventionally
defined financial deficit as a fraction of GDP, then the adjusted
financial deficit, d, is given by
t t
t
t t
t -1
*d  =  d  +  (1+ )(1+ g )
b
e
p
xiii. The equality would be exact in a continuous time
representation of the debt-GDP dynamics.
xiv. The equality would be exact in a continuous time
representation of the debt-GDP dynamics.
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xv. Denote the required N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio at
time t by RN t-1 t-1+Ns (b -b )Error! Main Document Only. and the actual
N-period seigniorage-GDP ratio by AN  s Error! Main Document
Only..  Note that,
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The required N-Period primary surplus-GDP ratio (for N³1) is
given by
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Let the  actual N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio be
denoted ANs  Error! Main Document Only. :
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The N-period primary gap, denoted NGAP  Error! Main Document
Only., is given by :
N
t-1 t-1+N R
N
t-1 t-1+N A
NGAP (b -b )  s (b -b ) -  sº
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xvi. GAP1 (0) is the excess of the primary surplus that would just
stabilise the debt-GDP ratio in period t over the primary surplus
planned or expected for period t.  This equal to
1 t t
t
t -1 tGAP (0)  
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xvii. Denoting the long-run real rate of interest by r¥ and the long-
run growth rate of real GDP by g¥ , the solvency gap is formally
given by
¥
¥ ¥
¥
¥ ¥º
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÷GAP   
r - g
1+ g
b  -   -  st-1 A As
Here A ¥s Error! Main Document Only. denotes the permanent
planned or expected seigniorage-GDP ratio and As  ¥ Error! Main
Document Only.denotes the permanent planned or expected
primary surplus-GDP ratio.
xviii. The myopic permanent primary gap, MGAP¥ , is defined as
follows:
MGAP
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The rate of inflation that maximises steady-state seigniorage is
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xx. Recent insights into the optimal use of distortionary taxes on
the returns from durable (capital) assets, due to Chamley [1986] (see
also Lucas [1990], Zhu [1992] and Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti
[1994]) imply that, at least in some of the standard neoclassical
models, the Friedman rule for the optimal quantity of money (the
nominal rate of interest should be zero and satiation with real money
balances should occur) still applies despite the fact that there are no
non-distortionary tax instruments available for financing public
expenditure (see Buiter [1995a]).
xxi. net of the value of its external assets.  Obvious corrections must
be made if the interest rate on the central bank’s banks interest-
bearing liabilities differs from the interest rate on international
reserves, when both are expressed in a common currency.
xxii. The effect applies equally when the delay in payment is limited
to the legally permitted grace period and when the tax payments are
technically in arrears.
xxiii. To the extent that the Fischer hypothesis does not hold and
higher anticipated inflation reduces the real rate of interest, the real
value of the debt is eroded even by higher anticipated inflation.
xxiv. The “need” for seigniorage cannot be inferred accurately from
the government deficit-GDP ratio, as this includes nominal interest
payments which will be inflated (in every sense of the word) by a
high rate of inflation. An inflation- and real growth-corrected deficit-
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GDP ratio provides a better guide to the magnitude of the seigniorage
required in the long-run (as a proportion of GDP).
xxv. Van Aarle and Budina do not include real output or any other
“scale variable” as an argument in their base money demand
functions.  I interpret their equation as if it had a unitary elasticity of
real money demand with respect to real output.
xxvi. I ignore the real growth rate terms in the expressions for the
long-run seigniorage maximising inflation rate and the long-run
maximal seigniorage-GDP ratio in the two equations given in
endnote 33.  Van Aarle and Budina have the logarithm of real
money balances as the dependent variable in their money demand
equations and do not include real GDP or some other scale variable
as a regressor.
xxvii. When the current advanced OECD countries had the
levels of per capita income achieved now by the advanced transition
economies, their public spending shares were considerably below
those achieved currently by the advanced transition economies.
xxviii. Taxing the profits of (partly) foreign-owned enterprises
will of course be subject to the usual transfer-pricing problems.
xxix. In this section no attention is paid to the distinction between
ex-post and ex-ante rates of return, as this is not relevant to the point
made.  I do not recommend this as a general rule of thumb.
xxx. “augmented” means inclusive of quasi-fiscal transactions.
xxxi. Indeed the VAT operated in the OECD countries too has been
shown to have high administrative costs (to the tax department) and
high compliance costs for businesses trying to carry out the
obligations of calculating and paying the tax (see eg Cnossen
[1994]).
xxxii. Estonia’s tax reform of 1992 and 1993 contained strong
elements of tax simplification, by reducing exemptions, and by
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simplifying rates. In 1994 the personal income tax changed to a flat
rate of 26% (the same as the corporate income tax rate), with an
exemption (or allowance) at the lower end.
TABLE 1
Seigniorage in Six East-European Countries**
1991 1992 1993 1994 Average
Bulgaria:  F -1.03 7.81 2.51 5.55 3.71
           B 338.8 79.4 63.8 121.9 131.3
           h 22.9 14.81 15.19 9.69 15.65
          Bh 77.59 11.76 9.69 11.81 27.71
Czech Rep: F -0.02 3.11 1.55
           B 18.75 9.70 14.13
           h 11.93 9.94 10.63
           Bh 2.12 0.96 1.54
Hungary:  F* 2.26
10.70
2.14
3.06
1.45
3.43
0.91
3.67
1.69
5.22
           B 31.01 24.69 21.13 21.23 24.45
           h* 9.25
21.00
9.77
26.91
9.88
24.87
9.25
23.11
9.54
23.97
          Bh* 2.87
6.51
2.41
6.64
2.09
5.25
1.96
4.91
2.33
5.83
Poland: F 3.12 2.77 1.54 1.70 2.28
           B 60.33 44.43 37.69 29.39 42.52
           h 9.60 9.02 8.70 7.43 8.69
          Bh 5.79 4.01 3.28 2.18 3.69
Romania: F 1.37 4.17 3.49 4.04 3.27
           B 222.80 199.21 295.48 61.74 180.35
           h 14.69 5.90 3.05 2.67 6.58
          Bh 32.73 11.75 9.01 1.65 11.87
Slovak Rep: F -1.03 3.85 1.41
            B 25.00 11.66 18.14
            h 9.48 11.95 10.72
           Bh 2.37 1.39 1.94
F: Seigniorage (% of GDP);  p: Inflation rate (CPI) (annual percentage rate)
h: Money base (bop) (% of GDP);  ph: inflation tax (% of GDP)
Average is over years for which seigniorage figures are given.
* first figure based on domestic currency in circulation only; second figure based on monetary
   base including bank reserves with the central bank.
** I did not include the interest foregone measure, as reliable interest data did not seem to be available.
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TABLE 2
Seigniorage in Six FSU Countries*
1991 1992 1993 1994 Average
Estonia:  F 9.38 1.28 5.33
           B 35.72 41.58 38.62
           h 8.38 11.11 9.75
          Bh 2.99 4.62 3.76
Kazakhstan: F 5.95 5.95
           B 3050.00 2167.57 1160.26 1160.26
           h 0.87 0.87
           Bh 10.09 10.09
Kyrgyz Rep: F 15.78 6.45 5.06 9.10
           B 1264.00 1366.28 87.15 620.68
           h 3.12 2.68 4.84 3.55
          Bh 39.43 36.62 4.22 22.03
Lithuania:  F 5.80 3.15 4.48
           B 1163.50 188.85 44.95 104.62
           h 3.40 5.08 4.24
          Bh 6.42 2.28 4.44
Russian Fed: F 20.88 11.16 6.14 12.73
           B 2501.39 841.62 202.68 805.08
           h 1.94 2.63 3.55 2.71
          Bh 48.53 22.13 7.19 21.82
Ukraine: F 14.00 17.13 11.03 14.05
            B 1860.00 10104.01 408.03 2065.90
            h 1.08 0.40 2.37 1.28
           Bh 20.08 40.42 9.67 26.44
F: Seigniorage (% of GDP)
B: Inflation rate (CPI) (annual percentage rate)
h: Money base (bop) (% of GDP)
Bh: inflation tax (% of GDP)
The average is over years for which seigniorage figures are given.
            *I did not include the interest foregone measure, as reliable interest data did not seem to be available.
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TABLE 3
Dce and Financial Deficits in Six East European Countries (% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Bulgaria F -1.03 7.81 2.51 5.55
dce(1)1 0.06 2.84 5.39 5.13
dce(2)2 2.70 4.58 5.45 7.91
deficit 14.66 15.04 15.72 7.03
Czech Rep. F -0.02 3.11
dce -5.0 -2.5
deficit -0.56 1.29
Hungary F 10.70 3.06 3.43 3.67
dce(1)3 2.15 2.17 -2.66 2.72
dce(2)4 2.54 5.10 -3.42 5.27
deficit 1.70 5.40 6.80 6.30
Poland F 3.12 2.77 1.54 1.70
dce(1) 4.84 0.85 0.80 -0.98
dce(2) 4.69 2.20 1.34 0.48
deficit 6.66 6.63 2.89 2.46
Romania F 1.37 4.17 3.49 4.04
dce 5.28 6.07 3.69 1.92
deficit -0.50 4.60 0.10 1.07
dce-deficit 5.78 1.47 3.59 1.85
Slovak Rep. F -1.03 3.85
dce -1.9 -6.0
deficit 7.60 1.40
F: seigniorage as a percentage of GDP
dce(i): Domestic credit expansion as a percentage of GDP, based on international
reserve accumulation measure i, i=1,2.
deficit: general government financial deficit as a percentage of GDP.
1 Based on change in NIR.
2 Based on change in NFA.
3 Based on change in NIR, but including valuation changes due to exchange rate movements.
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TABLE 4
Dce and Financial Deficits in Six FSU Countries (% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Estonia F 9.38 1.28
dce(1) -152.39 -10.11
dce(2) NA NA
deficit 0.7 1.4
Kazakhstan F NA 5.95
dce(1) NA 4.26
dce(2) NA 5.17
deficit NA 6.55*
Kyrgyz Rep F 15.78 6.45 5.06
dce(1) 27.16 -40.05
dce(2) NA NA
deficit 13.50 8.40
Lithuania F 5.80 3.15
dce(1) NA 3.43
dec(2) 3.98 3.26
deficit -0.60 4.40
Russian Fed F 20.88 11.16 6.14
dce(1) NA 7.31 6.07
dce(2) NA NA NA
deficit 29.36 8.13 11.46
Ukraine F 14.00 17.13 11.03
dce(1) NA NA 10.35
dce(2) NA NA NA
deficit 14.10 30.40 10.10 8.60
F: seigniorage as a percentage of GDP.
dce(i): Domestic credit expansion as a percentage of GDP, based on international
reserve accumulation measure i, i=1,2.
deficit: general government financial deficit as a percentage of GDP.
*General government deficit of -0.30% of GDP plus quasi-fiscal deficit of 6.90% of GDP.
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TABLE 5
Real Growth Rates and Real Interest Rates in 12 Transition Economies
(% per year)
1991 1992 1993 1994* 1995**
Bul g -11.7 -7.3 -2.4 1.4 2.5
r NA NA -5.4 -20.7 NA
Cze g -14.2 -6.4 -0.9 2.6 4
r NA NA -6.9 0.4 NA
Hun g -11.9 -3.0 -0.9 2 3
r 1.4 3.2 -0.5 2.2 NA
Pol g -7.6 2.6 3.8 5.0 5.5
r -1.0 -2.1 -2.1 2.0 NA
Rom g -12.9 -10.0 1.3 3.4 4
r NA NA -47.8 75.5 NA
Slo g -14.5 -7.0 -4.1 4.8 5
r NA NA -7.9 4.2 NA
Est g -11 -21.6 -8.4 3 4
r NA NA -7.7 -16.6 NA
Kaz g -13 -12 -12 -25 -12
r NA -95.1 -86.8 -33.8 NA
Kyr g -5 -25 -16 -27 -5
r NA NA NA NA NA
Lit g -13.1 -33.7 -24.2 1.7 5
r NA NA -21.5 13.8 NA
Rus g -13 -19 -12 -15 -4
r NA NA NA NA NA
Ukr g -12 -17 -17 -23 -5
r NA NA NA NA NA
* estimate.
** projection.
Source:  GDP growth rates: Transition Report 1995, EBRD.
  Real interest rates: own calculations based on IMF data.
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TABLE 6
Debts, Deficits and Primary Surpluses in Six East-European Countries
(% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Bulgaria debt: tot.
        dom.
        ext.
230.9
  33.5
 197.4
178.9
   30.6
  148.4
172.2
  35.5
 136.7
165.9
  50.2
 115.7
deficit 14.7 15.4 15.7 7.0
prim. sur. 3.2 0.9 -1.5 7.0
Czech
Rep
Debt*: tot.
           dom.
           ext.
20.3
  11.3
   8.9
17.4
  9.5
  8.0
15.6
  9.1
  6.5
deficit  2.2 -0.6  1.3
prim. sur. -1.2  2.2  0.1
Hungary debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
75.9
4.8
71.1
80.7
     4.6
76.1
91.2
   5.8
85.4
88.4
     5.6
82.8
deficit 1.7 5.4 6.8 6.3
prim. sur. 2.1 0.5 -2.0 0.4
Poland debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
81.5
  15.7
  65.8
85.2
  21.1
  64.1
85.8
  22.9
  63.0
78.5
  22.6
  55.9
deficit 6.7 6.7 2.9 2.5
prim. sur. -5.1 -3.4 0.5 1.5
Romania debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
2.9
   0.0
   2.9
12.2
  0.5
  11.7
23.0
  12.9
  10.1
21.1
  3.6
  17.53
deficit -0.5 4.6 0.1 1.1
prim. sur. 0.54 4.4 0.9 0.3
Slovak
Rep
debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
22.7
   2.4
  20.4
25.1
   2.7
   22.4
36.4
   10.2
   26.2
deficit 12.8 7.6 1.4
prim. sur. -11.6 -4.2 2.9
* Central government only.
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TABLE 7
Debts, Deficits and Primary Surpluses in Six FSU Countries (% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994
Estonia debt: tot.
         dom.
          ext.
NA
NA
NA
NA
  NA
  0.2
NA
  NA
  0.4
NA
NA
NA
deficit -5.2 0.3 0.7 1.4
prim. sur. 5.2 -0.3 -0.6 -1.1
Kazakhstan debt*: tot.
           dom.
           ext.
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
   NA
   36.9
NA
   NA
   16.3
deficit* 7.9 7.3 3.7 6.6**
prim. sur. NA NA NA NA
Kyrgyz Rep debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
37.7
   9.1
   28.6
NA
NA
NA
deficit -4.6 13.5 13.5 8.4
prim. sur. 4.6 -13.5 -13.1 NA
Lithuania debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
NA
NA
16.6
NA
NA
11.4
NA
NA
9.8
NA
NA
7.9
deficit -4.8 -0.7 -0.6 4.4
prim. sur. 4.8 0.7 0.6 -4.3
Russian Fed debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
84.9
76.9
  8.0
198.9
  18.2
 180.7
74.8
   10.9
   63.90
82.3
   14.78
   67.56
deficit NA 29.4 8.1 11.5
prim. sur. NA -18.9 -5.6 -8.21
Ukraine debt: tot.
         dom.
         ext.
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
17.2
NA
NA
12.1
NA
NA
28.7
deficit NA NA NA NA
prim. sur. -14.1 -30.40 -10.1 -8.6
* Cash.
** Including the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank.
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TABLE 8
General Government Revenues in Some Transition Economies (% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995*
estimate
Kazakhstan 25.0 24.6 19.8 17.1 16.0
Kyrgyz
Republic
35.7 12.7 23.3 21.6 14.5**
Lithuania 41.4 32.1 28.5 24.5 22.4
Russian
Federation
NA 41.7 37.8 33.3
Ukraine 36.5 41.5 41.1 44.3 41.3***
Romania 39.3 37.6 33.6 32.5 33.5
* Source: EBRD Transition Report Update, April 1996.
** Government expenditure and net lending plus government balance.
*** State budget revenue.
TABLE 9
General Government Spending in Some Transition Economies (% of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995*
estimate
Bulgaria 55.1 53.4 50.9 45.0 45.3
Czech
Republic
49.6 50.1 50.7 na
Hungary 53.6 60.6 63.3 59.2 56.1
Poland 48.9 50.4 50.5 48.9 na
Slovak
Republic
62.6 55.7 52.8 53
Russian
Federation
71.3 45.9 44.7 na
Ukraine 50.6 71.9 51.2 52.9 45.4**
* Source: EBRD Transition Report Update, April 1996.
** State budget expenditure.
65
65
REFERENCES
Aarle, Bas van and Nina Budina [1995], “Currency Substitution in
Eastern Europe”, Tilburg University, Center for Economic
Research Discussion Paper No. 9502, January.
Abel, Andrew, N. Gregory Mankiw, Lawrence H. Summers and
Richard J. Zeckhauser [1989], “Assessing Dynamic Efficiency:
Theory and Evidence”, Review of Economic Studies, 56,
January, pp. 1-20.
Anand, Ritu and Sweder van Wijnbergen [1989], “Inflation and the
financing of government expenditure: an introductory analysis
with an application to Turkey”, World Bank Economic
Review, 3, 1, pp. 17-38.
Auerbach, Alan J., Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoff
[1991], “Generational accounts; A meaningful alternative to
deficit accounting”, in David Bradford ed. Tax Policy and the
Economy, Vol. 5, MIT Press.
Balcerowicz, Leszek and Alan Gelb [1994], “Macropolicies in
Transition to a Market Economy: A Three-Year Perspective”,
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on
Development Economics 1994, pp. 21-44.
Blanchard, Olivier [1990], “Suggestions for a new set of fiscal
indicators”, OECD Department of Economics and Statistics
Working Papers, No. 79, April.
Blanchard, Olivier, Jean-Claude Chouraqui, Robert P. Hageman and
Nicola Sortor [1990], “The sustainability of fiscal policy: new
answers to an old question”, OECD Economic Studies, No. 15,
Autumn.
66
Buiter, Willem H. [1983], “The theory of optimum deficits and
debt”, in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series
No. 27, The Economics of Large Government Deficits,
October, pp. 4-69.
Buiter, Willem H. [1985], “A guide to public sector debt and
deficits”, Economic Policy, October, pp. 4-69.
Buiter, Willem H. [1993a], “Consistency checks for fiscal, financial
and monetary policy evaluation and design”, mimeo, World
Bank, October.
Buiter, Willem H. [1993b], “QPFISMO: a spreadsheet for checking
the internal consistency of fiscal, financial and monetary policy
programs”, World Bank, mimeo, November.
Buiter, Willem H. [1995a], “Politique macroéconomique dans la
période de transition vers l’union monétaire”, Revue
d’Economie Politique, 105(5), September/October, pp. 897-
946..
Buiter, Willem H. [1995b], “Generational accounts, aggregate saving
and intergenerational distribution”, forthcoming in Economica,
1996/7.
Buiter, Willem H. [1996], “Aspects of Fiscal Performance in Some
Transition Economies under Fund-Supported Programs”,
University of Cambridge, mimeo, March.
Buiter, Willem H. and Kenneth M. Kletzer [1994], “Government
Solvency, Ponzi finance and the Redundancy and Usefulness
of Public Debt, University of Santa Cruz Working Paper No.
292.
67
Buiter, Willem H. and Ricardo Lago [1995], “Enterprises in
Transition: Macroeconomic Influences on Enterprise Decision-
Making and Performance”, EBRD Mimeo, November.
Buiter, Willem H., Ricardo Lago and Nicholas Stern [1995],
“Enterprise Performance and Macroeconomic Control”,
Mimeo, May.
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Fabrizio Coricelli [1992], “Stabilising a
previously centrally planned economy: Poland 1990”,
Economic Policy, April, pp. 176-226.
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Manmohan S. Kumar [1994], “Money
Demand, Bank Credit, and Economic Performance in Former
Socialist Economies”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 41, No. 2, June,
pp. 314-349.
Chadha, Bankim and Fabrizio Coricelli [1994], “Fiscal constraints
and the speed of transition”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 993,
July.
Chamley, Christophe [1986], “Optimal taxation of capital income in
general equilibrium with infinite lives”, Econometrica, 54,
May, pp. 607-622.
Cnossen, Sijbren [1994], “Administrative and compliance costs of
the VAT”, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Research Centre for
Economic Policy, Research Memorandum 9402.
Dittus, Peter [1994], “Corporate Governance in Central Europe: The
Role of Banks”, Bank for International Settlements, Monetary
and Economic Department, BIS Economic Papers, No. 42,
August.
68
Easterly, William and Paulo Vieira da Cunha [1994], “Financing the
Storm: Macroeconomic Crisis in Russia”, Economics of
Transition, Vol 2, No. 4, December, pp. 443-465.
Halpern, László and Charles Wyplosz [1995], “Equilibrium Real
Exchange Rates in Transition”, CEPR Discussion Paper No.
1145, April.
Hernández-Catá, Ernesto [1995], “Russia and the IMF; The Political
Economy of Macro-Stabilisation”, Problems of Post-
Communism, pp. 19-26, May/June.
IMF [1994], “Eastern Europe - Factors Underlying the Weakening
Performance of Tax Revenues”, IMF Working Paper, WP/94/
,European I Department, August.
IMF [1995a], “Stabilisation and Structural Change in Russia, 1992-
94”, IMF Working Paper WP/95/13, European II Department
(vincent Koen and Michael Marrese), January.
IMF [1995b], “Quasi-Fiscal Operations of Public Financial
Institutions”, IMF Working Paper SM/95/65, Fiscal Affairs
Department, April 3.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. [1989], “From deficit delusion to the fiscal
balance rule: looking for an economically meaningful way to
assess fiscal policy”, NBER Working Paper No. 2841,
February.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. [1990], “Supply-side economics: an analytical
review”, Oxford Economic Papers, 42, pp. 293-316.
McLure, Charles E. Jr. [1992], “A Simpler Consumption-Based
Alternative to the Income Tax for Socialist Economies in
69
Transition”, World Bank Research Observer, Vol 7, No. 2,
July, pp. 221-237.
Melo, Martha de, Cevdet Denizer and Alan Gelb [1995], “From
Plan to Market: Patterns of Transition”, World Bank, mimeo,
March.
Mody, Ashoka and Dilip Patro [1995], “Methods of Loan Guarantee
Valuation and Accounting”, World Bank Mimeo, March.
Roubini, Nouriel and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti [1994], “Optimal
taxation of human and physical capital in endogenous growth
models”, NBER Working Paper No. 4882, October.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. [1994], “Russia’s Struggle with Stabilisation:
Conceptual Issues and Evidence”,  Proceedings of the World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994.
Schaffer, Mark E. [1992], “The Enterprise Sector and Emergence of
the Polish Fiscal Crisis 1990-91”, LSE, CEP Working Paper
No. 280, September.
Tait, Alan A. [1992], “ A Not-So-Simple Alternative to the Income
Tax for Socialist Economies in Transition: A Comment on
McLure”,  World Bank Research Observer, Vol 7, No. 2, July,
pp. 239-248.
Tanzi, Vito [1993], “The budget deficit in transition”, IMF Staff
Papers, Vol. 40 No. 3, September, pp. 697-707.
Zhu, Xiadong [1992], “Optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth
model”, Journal of Economic Theory, 58, December, pp. 250-
289.
